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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. intelligence community is without peer in providing high-quality, 
detailed technical intelligence. Due to the intelligence community’s efforts, the USG has 
a thorough understanding of its adversaries’ activities. What we propose is to develop a 
means by which that same intelligence community can use cultural factors to answer the 
question “Why?” Although cultural intelligence plays a key role in many of America’s 
political and military successes, the maintenance of a broad-based, detailed cultural 
intelligence capability has thus far proven elusive. With the advent of networked 
collaboration tools, the intelligence community now has the ability to deploy a virtual 
cultural intelligence community. Such a community, based on a wiki, would incur almost 
no monetary or bureaucratic overhead, and could be configured so that the loss of any 
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I. BUILDING A VIRTUAL CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
A. SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if it is possible or feasible to create a 
“virtual” cultural intelligence community. This cultural information network would 
enable the Special Operations community to have an intelligence resource that is devoted 
to in-depth analysis of the cultural dimensions of various regions, and thus enable them to 
better fine-tune their operations. Additionally, it would serve as a means to maintain 
accurate and timely information on cultural issues relevant to U.S. conventional military 
forces and other government agencies. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will follow four methodological steps.  We will begin by conducting a 
review of current U.S. intelligence doctrine and show (1) The present structure does not 
conduct cultural intelligence in support of SOF and (2) Creating another bureaucracy is 
not the solution to building a responsive cultural intelligence community. We intend to 
report on the failure of U.S. intelligence and issues within the SF and PSYOP 
communities regarding cultural intelligence in order to highlight this lack of capability. 
Second, we intend to show how modern technology, in the form of wikis and 
blogs, can be used to create a virtual cultural intelligence network. This will draw on 
literature on the formation of networks and the collective knowledge of groups to show 
how a cultural intelligence community can be formed in the virtual environment to 
address SOF needs. 
Third, we will identify what communities can be tapped to provide the collective 
knowledge for the virtual cultural intelligence network to be functional and relevant. We 
will also address perceived security and connectivity issues in order to show that cultural 
intelligence can be handled as an open source intelligence (OSINT) issue. 
Fourth, we will propose a model for implementing a virtual cultural intelligence 
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II. INTELLIGENCE VERSUS CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE 
A. EXISTING DOCTRINE 
The U.S. Army’s Intelligence field manual states clearly that the intelligence 
community should be “. . . performing intelligence readiness on a daily basis in order to 
meet the requirements for strategic responsiveness.”1 In other words, intelligence 
operations should be conducted in such a manner that the right intelligence is available 
when commanders determine they need to execute an operation. Further, paragraph 1-116 
of the document goes on to state that intelligence officers (G2/S2) should: 
• Plan, train, and practice surging intelligence functions on likely or 
developing contingency crises. 
• Establish formal or informal intelligence links, relationships, and 
networks to meet developing contingencies.2 
These guidelines stand in direct contradiction to how the modern operations and 
intelligence cycles are typically conducted. 
The modern intelligence cycle is demand driven. As described above in the 
reference from FM 2-0, and echoed by noted intelligence analyst Mark Lowenthal: 
Some intelligence managers . . . would note, correctly, that one function of 
intelligence is to look ahead, to identify issues that are not high priority at 
present but may be so in the future. But, as important as this function is, it 
is difficult to get policy makers to focus on issues that are far off or only 
possibly significant. They are hard-pressed to work on issues demanding 
immediate attention.3  
An intelligence consumer identifies a mission, then asks the intelligence community to 
provide data in support of the mission. This is problematic in that there may exist a 
paucity of intelligence data for certain areas, which leads to a number of further issues. 
The first is a time gap. The consumer needs to take action, but cannot until sufficient 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 2-0: Intelligence (May 2004) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office), 1-31. 
2 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 2-0: Intelligence, 1-32 – 1-33. 
3 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Third Edition) (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2006), 56. 
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intelligence has been generated which supports his desired or projected course of action. 
In the time it takes to develop meaningful intelligence based on the original requirements, 
the situation may have changed significantly enough that the hastily-formed intelligence 
becomes invalid. A second problem is that a demand-driven cycle does not allow 
intelligence to suggest possible operations – rather, proposed operations demand 
intelligence that supports them. Thus, even if intelligence exists on an area of interest, 
demand-based operations will require still more intelligence to fill in the gaps. A third 
issue is that demand-based intelligence is frequently “desperation” intelligence, and as 
such it can result in mistakes. In their rush to provide “anything,” analysts may do just 
that. The process may involve cognitive filters, incomplete vetting of ideas, etc., all 
conducted in a time-constrained environment, but the result is error, oversight, and 
ultimately, greater potential for operational failure. 
A look at the intelligence community prior to the fall of the Soviet Union provides 
an excellent illustration of the concept of a demand-driven cycle. Consumers clamored 
for more and more intelligence on the strength, momentum, and future of the Soviet 
Union – in essence, validation of their view of the Soviet threat to America and its allies.4 
At the time, there were virtually no means by which analysts could casually converse or 
share detailed information about contrary trends that were, in retrospect, in ample 
evidence.5 Further, there was a great deal of investment (both monetary and 
psychological) in overhead collection technology and “enlightened democracy versus 
godless communism” mindset that supported the status quo.6 The psychological 
investment lent itself to support of the United States’ own technical systems. They were 
literally so awesome, expensive, and secret that their relevance was difficult to deny. 
A supply-driven intelligence cycle – as recommended by FM 2-0 – may offer a 
partial solution to the intelligence gap. Given the opportunity to examine a broad range of 
topics of interest, analysts might pursue leads that do not necessarily contribute to 
consumer demands for intelligence. More to the point, the intelligence community could 
 
4 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 222. 
5 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 227. 
6 Robert L. O’Connell, “Decadent Intelligence” (computer printout, Department of Defense Analysis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Summer 1997), 2. 
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supply intelligence on topics of appropriate current interest simply because it is what they 
are looking at, as opposed to topics of directed study. A broad-based, collaborative 
intelligence community could concern itself with matters of current interest, though a few 
well-placed questions from consumers might serve to open new routes of research. In this 
manner, intelligence in a supply-driven cycle will follow its own course, with input from 
current events. 
B. CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE 
There is a tremendous need for cultural intelligence within the U.S. military, and 
especially in the Special Operations community. One topic of expanding interest is 
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The newly-approved Army COIN manual has 
this to say about intelligence in support of COIN: 
3-8. The purpose of planning and IPB [Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield] before deployment is to develop an understanding of the 
operational environment. . . . It should focus on the host nation, its people, 
and insurgents in the area of operations (AO). Commanders and staffs use 
predeployment intelligence to establish a plan for addressing the 
underlying causes of the insurgency and to prepare their units to interact 
with the populace appropriately. 
3-9. IPB in COIN operations follows the methodology described in FM 
34-130/FMFRP 3-23-2. However, it places greater emphasis on civil 
considerations, especially people and leaders in the AO, than does IPB for 
conventional operations. . . . IPB in COIN requires personnel to work in 
areas like economics, anthropology, and governance that may be outside 
their expertise. . .7 
Concepts such as these are not to be dismissed simply as stale doctrine with no meaning 
to warriors in the real world. Rather, they stand as testament to the attitudes, concerns, 
and actions of those at the tip of the spear. As a case in point, when an interviewer 
recently asked SOCPAC8 Commander MG John Fridovich (U.S. Army) what assistance 
he would find useful from resources such as online distributed learning and knowledge 
management, he responded with the following: 
 
7 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, December 2006), 3-2. 
8 Special Operations Command Pacific. 
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We would welcome in-depth socio-economic and cultural analysis of 
some of the austere areas where we train with our partners, as well as 
focused research on underlying conditions that foster terrorism. 
Before launching a CT [counter-terrorism] or COIN initiatives, SOF must 
understand what is happening on the ground from various perspectives, to 
include the local radicalization process. External approaches designed to 
improve local conditions in a COIN environment will fail if they do not 
include parallel and simultaneous engagement with how people perceive 
the world they inhabit. 
SOF professionals must comprehensively understand the socio-economic, 
historical, and cultural landscape in which social and political movements 
– to include terrorist groups – live. If we do not appreciate the complexity 
and richness of the values and concerns of the people with whom we are 
engaging, we will miss the mark. 
Therefore, systematic polling, surveys, multi-disciplinary assessments, 
open source analysis, and focus group interviews would help us better 
understand the local radicalization process, as well as seeing more clearly 
what effect we are having in promoting security and addressing local 
grievances.9 
In just a few sentences, MG Fridovich succinctly encapsulates what is not being done to 
help modern warfighters accomplish their missions, and with minimal use of force. 
Further, he reconfirms that some current doctrine is in line with reality.10 
 In truth, however, neither MG Fridovich’s comments nor the guidance provided 
in FM 3-24 are revolutionary or original. Over 50 years ago, Paul Linebarger, a 
psychological operations officer from WWII, offered similar insights.  
Linebarger identifies five skills that he feels an individual needs to possess in 
order to be an effective psychological operations planner and operator. Most of the skills 
deal directly with the ability to create and disseminate a message that can produce the 
 
9 Daniel P. Fridovich, Major General U.S. Army, interview by Jeff McKaughan, “Building Capacity 
and Partnerships Throughout the Region,” Special Operations Technology, volume 5, issue 2, March 2007, 
28. 
10 Colonel Eric Wendt states that in order for counterinsurgency operations to succeed, the personnel 
participating in such operations require “detailed local knowledge . . . cultural and area familiarization” so 
that they can properly implement a rewards program for the area that leads to the development of 
actionable intelligence. This is inline with the requirements for cultural intelligence that MG Fridovich lays 
out. Eric P. Wendt, Colonel U.S. Army, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare, 
September 2005, 3. 
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effects intended by the United States; but one skill in particular focuses on the ability to 
reach the target audience precisely. Linebarger states that “Professional scientific 
understanding of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, or a 
comparable field”11 is one of the requirements for planning and executing effective 
psychological operations.  
More specifically, Linebarger’s five skills are: 
1) An effective knowledge of the US government administration and 
policy, so that the purposes and plans of the government may be correctly 
interpreted. 
2) An effective knowledge of correct military and naval procedure and 
staff operations, together with enough understanding of the arts of 
warfare… 
3) Professional knowledge of the media of information, or at least one of 
them (book-publishing, magazines, newspapers, radio, advertising in its 
various branches), or of some closely related field (practical political 
canvassing, visual, or adult education, etc.). 
4) Intimate, professional-level understanding of a given area…based on 
first-hand acquaintance, knowledge of the language, traditions, history, 
practical politics, and customs. 
5) Professional scientific understanding of psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, history, political science, or a comparable field.” [italics 
added]12 
He states that there is no single perfect person who can accomplish this myriad of tasks, 
but does state that “However – and the qualification is important – each psychological 
warfare [PSYOP] team represents a composite of these skills.”13 
Although separated by over five decades and an amazing shift in adversaries, 
Linebarger’s concepts are surprisingly similar to MG Fridovich’s.  In fact, with a 
thorough reading of military history, one can determine that similar concepts crop up 
 
11 William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, MD: 
The John Hopkins Press, 1958), 159. 
12 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 159. 
13 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 159. 
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throughout the ages.   Yet, despite these concepts having been identified and re-
identified, they never seem to enjoy mainstream support. 
Extrapolating from Linebarger’s statement, one can determine that it is important 
that a cultural intelligence community represent a composite of skills that allows an in-
depth analysis of various cultural issues of interest to its clients. This cultural intelligence 
community must also operate in a competitive analysis environment. By having analysts 
in several agencies who have different backgrounds and perspectives work on an issue, 
parochial views more likely will be countered – if not weeded out – and a reasonable 
approximation of reality is more likely to be achieved.14  
U.S. Army FM 2-0 dedicates an entire appendix to linguist support.15 However, in 
that appendix, no mention is made of the cultural intelligence support that various types 
of linguists can provide. In fact, the entire manual touches only very lightly on the 
concept of cultural intelligence, with the bulk of anything that could be deemed remotely 
related to cultural intelligence residing in Chapter 6 (Human Intelligence – HUMINT) 
and Chapter 11 (Counterintelligence – CI). Even those chapters are more concerned with 
the mechanical aspects of implementing HUMINT or CI operations, rather than with the 
vital role that cultural intelligence plays. This is perfectly illustrated by the words of a 
soldier who had served in Iraq around 2003: 
I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil.  
Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in 
pickups and firing AK-47s and [rocket propelled grenades].  I had perfect 
situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great 
technical intelligence . . . wrong enemy.16 
This example typifies the intelligence community’s preference for technology over 
psychology. In most cases, it is easier to assess what the adversary is doing – satellites 
and signals intelligence can paint a very vivid picture – but the picture doesn’t tell us why 
the adversary is doing it. The case can be made, however, that knowledge of the 
 
14 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 14-15. 
15 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 2-0 Intelligence (May 2004), Appendix B, B-1 – B-11. 
16 Robert H. Scales, Jr., Major General U.S. Army, “Culture-Centric Warfare,” Proceedings, 
September 2004. 
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adversary’s reasons for acting might lead you to his expected actions. In other words, 
what cannot tell you why, but why might lead you to what. For example, substantial 
debate took place over Soviet “capabilities versus intentions” in the U.S. in the 1970s, 
with the “intent” crowd staking out the position that “Only intentions made it possible to 
gauge the true level of threat.”17 Standard intelligence can provide cultural information, 
but intelligence organizations rarely convert that cultural information into valuable 
cultural intelligence in the same manner they do with other, more concrete information.  
In determining the difference between cultural information and cultural 
intelligence, one first must look at the definitions of “information” and “intelligence.” 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary of American English, “information” is defined as 
“news, facts, or knowledge”18 and “intelligence” as “the ability to understand and learn 
well, and to form judgments and opinions based on reason.”19 Extrapolating from these 
definitions, cultural information is simply news, facts, or knowledge about culture and 
cultural intelligence is the ability to understand and learn well, and to form cultural 
judgments and opinions based on reason. Cultural intelligence is an analytic process that 
requires access to cultural information in order to produce well-reasoned analysis. Figure 
1 illustrates the relatively straightforward process required to refine cultural information 
into cultural intelligence. 
 
17 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 224. 
18 Cambridge Dictionary of American English, “Information,” Dictionary.Cambridge.Com, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=information*1+0&dict=A (accessed May 8, 2007). 
19 Cambridge Dictionary of American English, “Intelligence (Thinking Ability),” 
Dictionary.Cambridge.Com, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=intelligence*1+0&dict=A 
(accessed May 8, 2007). 
















CULTURAL INFORMATION LOW 
 
Despite the need for cultural intelligence, it may not be desirable to build an 
additional “physical” intelligence community devoted solely to cultural intelligence. The 
various segments of the intelligence community are already competing over a limited 
number of available and qualified analysts. Also, a typical paradigm in the intelligence 
community is to conduct analysis at some level of classification, which brings with it the 
need for a security clearance. The requirement for a security clearance artificially limits 
the number of personnel who can take part. On the other hand, the majority of 
information needed – and available – for cultural intelligence analysis is open source 
intelligence (OSINT). The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction submitted a report in March 2005 that 
insisted that OSINT must be included in the intelligence process. It highlighted the fact 
that only OSINT can “store history.” That is, only a robust open source program can, in 
effect, gather information to monitor the world’s cultures and how they change with time. 
In short, it would allow real time analysis of foreign countries and their issues.  
The gathering of a disparate group of experts together in one location to analyze 
cultural information is daunting and probably not feasible, since there would be intense 
resistance from the established covert agencies against sharing resources with any new 
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e of new media is the huge storage potential of the virtual 
cultura
ognized need for cultural intelligence, but at the same time, 
there e
                                                
need to be a “virtual community.” The virtual community, operating with the capacities 
of what Jan van Dijk calls “new media,” can overcome the lack of a physical structure 
through a combination of online and offline applications that seek not to replace local 
face-to-face communications by online mediated communication, but to enhance the 
potentially fruitful interplay between them. Van Dijk specifically states that “the most 
important structural new media characteristic is the integration of telecommunications, 
data communications, and mass communications in a single medium. It is the process of 
convergence.”20 New media has a potentially large geographical and social reach, limited 
only by the density of the Internet. It gives the cultural intelligence community the ability 
to be everywhere, anytime.21 
Perhaps the best featur
l intelligence community. The memory of the community is only limited by the 
storage capacity of the servers upon which it exists.22 It also allows the cultural 
intelligence community to conduct analysis on current information and “publish” those 
results near simultaneously. 
In short, there is a rec
xists an admitted lack of it. Department of Defense doctrine offers guidance 
suggesting a forward-looking intelligence process. By its nature, cultural intelligence is 
one of the best prospects to begin developing such a capacity. However, the breadth of 
information available on cultures – and the depth of analysis required to provide good 
intelligence from it – precludes the gathering of all the requisite experts in one location. 
This suggests that the best solution might be an inexpensive, unclassified, networked 







20 Jan A.G.M. van Dijk, The Network Society (Second Edition) (London: SAGE Publications, 2006), 
5-7. 
21 Van Dijk, The Network Society, 15. 
22 Van Dijk, The Network Society, 15. 
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III. NETWORKING KNOWLEDGE 
Networking cultural intelligence involves several key issues: building a self-
sustaining community of experts; linking those experts and their knowledge; 
strengthening the community to avoid dysfunction; and applying these requirements to an 
intelligence community. This chapter elaborates on that process. 
A. NETWORK KNOWLEDGE THEORY 
Dr. Robin Dunbar, an anthropologist at the University of Liverpool, studied 
primates and discovered a stable ratio between the relative size of the neocortex (thought 
to be responsible for the evolution of intelligence) and the size of groups formed by 
particular species. Also known as “Dunbar’s Number,” this leads to an upper limit on 
group size for humans of about 150. Many clans, tribes, fan clubs, start-ups and other 
groupings remain well below this limit, as do most blog networks.23 By defining the 
groups and assigning experts to them, a network could be developed that has the breadth 
and depth of both experience and talent to answer sophisticated cultural questions posed 
to it. For instance, a group dedicated to Arab societies could tap into populations of 
recent immigrants, sociologists, psychologists, theologists, and so on. 
Any community assembled to conduct cultural intelligence analysis needs to be 
viewed as a community of professionals. By utilizing the “consensual definition” of 
professionalism established by Joseph Raelin and Donald Miller as a guide, it is possible 
to define how the cultural intelligence community should look and operate. The 
characteristics of this definition include: 
• Expertise – normally gained from prolonged specialized training – in a 
body of abstract knowledge 
• Autonomy – a perceived right to make choices that concern both ends and 
means 
• Commitment to the work and the profession – in short the “calling” 
• Identification with the profession and other professionals 
                                                 
23 Malcom Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 2002), 177-181 and 185-186. 
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• Ethics – a felt obligation to render service without concern for self-interest 
and without becoming emotionally involved with clients 
• Collegial maintenance of standards – a perceived commitment to police 
the conduct of other professionals24 
A community of professionals, whom people see as experts in their given fields, 
will generally internalize most or all of the above characteristics. It is imperative that any 
community set up to analyze cultural information is able to maintain these characteristics, 
as these characteristics foster high standards among the community and prevent it from 
losing its diverse expertise. 
A community of experts also utilizes a capability that social psychologist Robert 
Cialdini describes as “Authority.” Laymen tend to recognize and pay attention to experts, 
much more than they do to “regular” folks like themselves.25 So, if an intelligence 
consumer interprets analysis as coming from a group of renowned authorities in their 
fields, he imparts greater weight to the experts’ information than he does to lesser 
figures’ analysis.26 But this tendency may also lead to a heterogeneous group moving its 
analysis to fit with that of the recognized expert, even if that expert is incorrect.27 Even if 
they have information that contradicts the “expert,” people’s general desire to defer to the 
authority figure can lead to biased analysis. The use of anonymity, while potentially 
detrimental to the conduct of an academic discussion, becomes paramount to ensure 
unbiased opinions when it comes to analysis. Implied expertise based merely on authority 
does not necessarily equate to accuracy in analysis.  
The observable diversity across the descriptions of culture (Chapter IV) is also 
observable within individual cultures. Amartya Sen provides some insight here when he 
states that “. . . culture is not a homogeneous attribute – there can be great variations 
within the same general cultural milieu.”28 It is easy to assume that there is “one culture” 
                                                 
24 Mary Ann von Glinow, The New Professionals: Managing Today’s High-Tech Employee 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), 12. 
25 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Quill, 1984), 214. 
26 Cialdini, Influence, 208-229. 
27 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York:, Anchor Books, 2004), 173-191. 
28 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2006), 112. 
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for an area or country, forcing artificial homogeneity onto a situation that is actually quite 
complicated and varied. Homogeneity can also be created by the viewpoint of the 
researcher – an anthropologist might focus on the aspects of culture important to his field, 
sometimes overlooking factors that would be picked up by theologists or historical 
economists. The desire to simplify the situation into personally meaningful segments 
often distorts the true situation on the ground. Rao and Walton add that they “. . . hesitate 
to privilege one definition over another. . . [culture] is not a set of primordial phenomena 
permanently embedded within national or religious or other groups, but rather a set of 
contested attributes, constantly in flux . . .”29 
An analogous phenomenon also exists within the military at many different levels. 
The Department of Defense, the various services, and their respective branches each 
maintain a different viewpoint on the composition of intelligence. More importantly, each 
entity imparts its own biases on the analysis of information. RAND researcher Carl 
Builder argues that the Army sees itself “ultimately, as the essential artisans of war . . . 
forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually supportive brotherhood of 
guilds.”30 But this guild mentality does not just exist within the Army; it permeates the 
military as a whole, and the intelligence community in particular. In a guild, members 
work their way “up the ranks” by proving their abilities at each level. When they have 
mastered one level, they progress to the next and begin the process anew. Such an 
apprenticeship is a process that develops an institutionalized skill, with specialization 
taken as a sign of expertise. This specialized expertise is exactly what should be avoided 
in studying culture, but the only clear way to avoid it is to mandate the incorporation of 
multiple viewpoints. This is not to imply a philosophical grudge match, where the 
participants struggle to determine whose opinion does not fit and is therefore invalid, but 
rather it is a cooperative effort wherein those with dissenting viewpoints engage in 
 
29 Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, Culture and Public Action (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), 4. 
30 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), 33. 
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dialogue to determine how and why they do fit together. As stated in Culture And Public 
Action, it is not just that culture matters, it is how culture matters.31 
Communities have a tendency to organize into homogeneous groups. A group of 
cultural analysts, if not structured appropriately, will do the same, with the inevitable 
result being analysis that conforms to the biases of the group. A method to overcome this 
tendency is to establish an overarching goal for the analysis community as a whole. This 
super-ordinate goal32 serves as a guide or beacon for the virtual community and helps to 
define the ultimate purpose of cultural analysis. The Department of Defense (protecting 
the country) and the Centers for Disease Control (preventing epidemics) both utilize 
super-ordinate goals to overcome the tendency of the disparate communities within their 
organizations to focus on issues that solely affect or are of particular interest to those 
communities. 
The tendency of people to form into like-minded groups is also an indicator of the 
level of trust present within the group. American philosopher Francis Fukuyama defines 
trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of 
that community.”33 A network of peers, due to its shared expectations and experiences, is 
more ready to trust members of that peer group than those outside. Thus, a collective 
decision-making network utilizing personnel from different fields becomes more difficult 
to establish and maintain due to the lower level of trust that exists among the various 
participants. 
However, the mere formation of a group of heterogeneous personnel does not 
ensure that they will maintain heterogeneous viewpoints. People have a strong tendency 
to seek out those similar to themselves. A process known as “homophily”34 serves to 
reinforce existing cognitive filters and may cause the virtual community’s analysis to 
 
31 Rao and Walton, Culture and Public Action, vii. 
32 Rob Cross and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks: Understanding How Work 
Really Gets Done in Organizations (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 128. 
33 Peter A. Gloor, Swarm Creativity: Competitive Advantage through Collaborative Innovation 
Networks (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 86. 
34 Cross and Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks, 83-84. 
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diverge from reality. A collective decision network produces the best decisions through 
disagreement and contention, a process that relies on the diversity and independence of 
the members of the analysis network.35 
Additionally, people do not have complete information; they have private, limited 
information. Sometimes this information is valuable and accurate, but it is always partial. 
Human beings also are not perfectly rational either. While some are altruistic in their 
actions, others seek to maximize their self-interest, but are unsure of how to do that. What 
results is a desire to settle for a less-than-perfect outcome.36 The formation of a 
heterogeneous collective decision network seeks to use peer pressure as a tool to 
overcome these tendencies. By creating a higher purpose within the community (the 
importance and value of the analysis), the desire to settle for the 80% solution can be 
minimized. But in the drive to create that analysis community, diversity must be a 
guiding principle in the selection of members. It is this diversity, as well as the range of 
variations in culture, that precludes the establishment of a single monolithic point of 
view. Unfortunately, there is another downside to diversity, which is a potential lack of 
focus on the part of the group (especially from within military circles), and could be a 
factor in devaluing the analysis gained from the group. This degradation can become a 
downward spiral as members of the group lower their expectations, causing the resulting 
analysis to slip in quality. The consumer of cultural intelligence might then continue to 
lower his expectations, establishing a vicious cycle. 
B.  WIKIS AND BLOGS 
A diverse grouping of cultural intelligence analysts would appear to provide the 
best solution for the dearth of cultural intelligence. But how can that endstate be achieved 
relatively quickly, cheaply, and without upsetting the balance of effort, power, and 
politics in the existing intelligence community? As is the case with many in the business 
 
35 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, xix. 
36 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, 105. 
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sector, the need for widespread collaboration may be filled by the “wiki.”37 Wikis are 
web pages that allow almost anyone in a community to log in and change them. Wikis are 
thus a very pure form of participatory creativity and intellectual sharing, and represent “a 
socialization of expertise.” Wikipedia, with its millions of users and potential editors, is 
an anomaly in the world of wikis. Joe Kraus, the co-founder of JotSpot, a provider of 
wiki software, surmises that most of the millions of wikis already in existence are 
designed for small, well-defined groups of people. Wikis are communities, and 
“communities require trust,” says Kraus.38 Trust comes most easily when the people 
involved know one another or are accountable for their contributions.39 This also fits with 
the idea of developing a professional cultural intelligence environment as membership in 
a wiki essentially becomes a peer review vehicle.  
But why wikis? According to Gloor, in order to encourage collaborative behavior, 
one must use a proper technology framework to create a highly personalized, globally 
accessible, collaborative workspace that embodies the three dimensions of online 
behavior: interactivity, connectivity, and sharing (Figure 2).40 Such a framework 
currently exists in the form of the wiki. Wikis allow for the creation of a virtual 
community that both encourages and grows from the community members’ interactivity, 
connectivity, and proclivity to share. It is this organic property of wikis that is essential 
for the establishment of a successful and sustainable virtual cultural intelligence 
community. 
 
37 Wikiwikiweb was the first of such software to be called a wiki. Ward Cunningham started 
developing WikiWikiWeb in 1994 and installed it on Internet domain c2.com on March 25, 1995. It was 
named by Cunningham, who remembered a Honolulu International Airport counter employee telling him to 
take the so-called “Wiki Wiki” Chance RT-52 shuttle bus line that runs between the airport's terminals. 
According to Cunningham, “I chose wiki-wiki as an alliterative substitute for 'quick' and thereby avoided 
naming this stuff quick-web.”  “Wiki Wiki” is a reduplication of “wiki,” a Hawaiian-language word for 
fast. Wikipedia, “What Is Wiki,” Wiki.Org, http://www.wiki.org/wiki.cgi?WhatIsWiki (accessed February 
19, 2007).  
38 The Economist, “The Wiki Principle,” Survey: New media, Economist.Com. 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6794228 (accessed April 26, 2006). 
39 The Economist, “The Wiki Principle.”  
40 “Interactivity” is the degree of interaction between the members of the community and is an indirect 
measure of their responsiveness to the community, “connectivity” is the degree to which everyone in the 
community is connected to other members of the community, and “sharing” is the degree to which 
members are willing to share information with other members of the community. Gloor, Swarm 
Intelligence, 119. 
Figure 2.   Three Dimensions of Collaborative Technologies41 
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One of the most important considerations when contemplating any shift in 
technology or methodology is the expense. It is on this point that the wiki has no peers. 
Wikipedia offers an excellent illustration of this: despite its tremendous success and 
worldwide coverage, operating costs (for hardware and software) for the year ending in 
June 2006 were only $426,209.42 In comparison to the billions of dollars annually 
allocated to the existing intelligence infrastructure, this barely qualifies as pocket change. 
 
41 Gloor, Swarm Creativity, 121. 
42 Gregory, Sharer & Stuart, P.A., “Statements of Financial Position,” Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., 
available online at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/foundation/2/28/Wikimedia_2006_fs.pdf, 
November 21, 2006 (accessed May 8, 2007). 
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In accordance with Einstein’s principle that “everything should be made as simple 
as possible, but no simpler,”43 the wiki was initially envisioned as “The simplest online 
database that could possibly work.”44 A wiki web site is typically server-based, and 
allows users to create and edit content from within their web browser. On the more open 
wikis, that means users can edit content posted by other users, though this is not a given.  
Wikis support many of the standards one expects to find on web pages, such as 
graphics, hyperlinks to outside sources, cross-links to other pages in the wiki, and so on. 
The ability of any user to edit any other user’s content is leveling, and creates a very 
democratic forum, while still maintaining the sought-after variety of opinion. The wiki 
interface is usually simple enough that even non-technical users can contribute.45 A wiki 
can be either the server-based web-site or the wiki software engine for the web-site. 
Whichever, the implementation of a wiki provides many organizations with an effective 
tool for mass collaborative authoring.46 
The wiki community itself establishes the validity of postings. This trust is 
reinforced by controlling the number of people with authority to change entries. Further, 
by limiting “change authority” to contributing members but allowing the larger “virtual” 
cultural intelligence community to access the wiki, the analysis has the potential for large 
distribution. It also would spur the development of a professional cultural intelligence 
community. Given the requirement of academics to be published, it is possible that a 
professional journal, tied to the wiki, and available to the general public, could be 
developed to provide an impetus to the academic community to provide support to the 
“virtual” cultural intelligence community.  
 
 
43 Albert Einstein's original statement was “The supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible 
basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of 
a single datum of experience.”  However, it is frequently paraphrased as noted in the text above. 
44 Wikipedia, “What Is Wiki,” Wiki.Org, http://www.wiki.org/wiki.cgi?WhatIsWiki (accessed 
February 19, 2007). 
45 Wikipedia, “What Is Wiki.”   
46 Wikipedia, “Wiki,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (accessed February 19, 
2007). 
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Additionally, with a management cell (in essence, a “cultural intelligence center”) 
based at a civilian institution of higher learning and primarily staffed by civilians to 
oversee the wiki and journal, further buy-in by the academic community would be 
enhanced. 
Blogs are user-generated websites, with entries presented in journal style, but in 
reverse chronological order. The term “blog” is a contraction of “web log,” or a log on 
the web. Like wikis, blogs support graphics, text, hyperlinks and cross-page links.  Many 
blogs will contain links to similar blogs, web sites, or other media related to the blog’s 
topic. Most blogs are interactive, as well, allowing readers to post comments on the 
blog’s content. As of November 2006, blog search engine Technorati was tracking nearly 
60 million blogs,47 indicating a sentiment among the general population that blogs are a 
worthy method of sharing information. 
Although Google CEO Erik Schmidt states that most blogs have a readership of 
one – the blogger himself,48 their widespread acceptance as a communications medium 
seems indicative of their utility. When tied to a wiki, a blog serves a key role in the 
tracking of concept evolution over time. 
C. ANALYSIS OF D. ANDRUS’ WORK 
In assessing the utility of wikis for a cultural intelligence community, it is 
instructive to examine literature that analyzes the current use of wikis and blogs for the 
intelligence community as a whole. The work of Dr. D. Calvin Andrus, an intelligence 
analyst at the CIA, is of particular interest. In June 2005, Dr. Andrus published a paper 
entitled “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence 
Community.”49 Dr. Andrus’ work addresses the fact that U.S. policy-makers, war-
fighters, and law-enforcers now operate in a real-time worldwide decision and 
implementation environment. The rapidly changing circumstances in which these 
professionals operate take on lives of their own, lives that are difficult or impossible to 
 
47 Wikipedia, “Blog,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (accessed February 19, 
2007). 
48 Daniel Cho, “10 Things Your Blogger Won't Tell You,” Smart Money, March 2007, 98-100. 
49 In 2004 Dr. Andrus received the Intelligence Community’s Galileo Award (an initiative of DCI 
George Tenet that invited members of the Intelligence Community to submit unclassified papers dealing 
with all aspects of the future of US intelligence) for an earlier unpublished version of this paper.  
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anticipate or predict. Andrus argues that in order to deal with this new operating 
environment the Intelligence Community must be transformed from a community with 
processes and procedures50 into a community that dramatically reinvents itself by 
continuously learning and adapting as the national security environment changes.51 It is 
only by shifting to a community that can operate in an ad hoc manner that future 
intelligence challenges can be met. 
Dr. Andrus observes that in this environment, the total “intelligence – decision – 
implementation” cycle timeframe can be as short as 15 minutes. This severe compression 
of response time ends up affecting not only high priority issues, but it “ripples back” into 
most routine intelligence, decision and implementation processes. Only by operating 
within the compressed response cycle can the United States maintain significant and 
tactical superiority over its adversaries.52 
But there is a physical limit to how fast humans can gather, process, analyze, and 
disseminate information. In a world where crises erupt on a regular basis, the amount of 
available information can overwhelm any system, leading to the imposition of analytical 
short-cuts in an attempt to regain control over the information required to operate 
successfully in a compressed response cycle. There is an alternative means, however, to 
reduce the amount of time devoted to gathering, processing, and analyzing information 
by front-loading these processes – that is, conduct the majority of them before the actual 
crisis occurs. But this solution requires that (1) a capacity exists in which to store the 
resulting analysis in a manner that can be readily accessed, and (2) this information 
repository will be utilized by the intelligence community when faced with a crisis. 
 
50 Wilson refers to Herbert Kaufman on this point, noting that once you start along the path of 
congressional or White House control and more constraints are imposed, “rigidities fixing agencies in their 
established ways intensify. As a result, complaints that they do not respond to controls also intensify. 
Further controls, checkpoints, and clearances are therefore introduced.”  It is these processes that reduce the 
responsiveness of agencies in general, and the intelligence community in particular. James Q. Wilson, 
Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989), 
367. 
51 D. Calvin Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community,” 
avaliable online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=755904, abstract (accessed 
February 12, 2007). 
52 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 1. 
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Dr. Andrus goes on to identify the need to have a complex adaptive system 
created to conduct the necessary intelligence work required for this constrained operating 
environment. Utilizing research conducted by The Santa Fe Institute and The Center for 
Complex Systems Research, he argues that complex adaptive systems must contain six 
critical components: (1) Self-organization; (2) Emergence – that is the whole (the system) 
is greater than the sum of its parts. If the system is merely a summation of the analysis 
conducted, it does not solve the issues of operating in a complex environment; (3) 
Relationships – more importantly, local relationships; (4) Feedback; (5) Adaptability; and 
(6) Non-Linearity – small changes in initial conditions or the external environment have 
large and potentially unpredictable consequences on the results of the system.53 
In applying these concepts to the dynamic reinvention of the intelligence 
community, Dr. Andrus argues that the community must be able to continuously learn 
and adapt as the security environment changes. In order to create this environment, 
though, the following changes need to be made: (1) Intelligence officers must be enabled 
to act more on their own – in independent, self-organized ways – to developments in the 
National Security environment; (2) Intelligence officers must be more expert in tradecraft 
and maintaining this expertise must become a constant quest; (3) Intelligence officers 
must share much more information because, when members of the Intelligence 
Community know where their colleagues are located in the “intellectual space,” it is 
easier to self-organize to respond in near real-time to National Security concerns; (4) 
Intelligence officers must receive more feedback from the national security environment 
so that they can learn from and adapt to the changing environment they operate in; and 
(5) Intelligence managers must be more persuasive about strategic objectives.54 
In particular, his third point, “Intelligence officers must share much more 
information,” deserves further attention. The military often calls the ability to know 
where one is in terms of the battle “situational awareness.” Situational awareness, 
however, is more than just knowing one’s own location on the ground, it is knowing the 
location of one’s enemy, the current state of one’s own forces, the effect of the geography 
 
53 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 7-9. 
54 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 12-13. 
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and other natural factors on any action either force can take, along with other assets 
available that can be utilized to assist in a determined course of action. For the 
intelligence community, situational awareness is understanding what information is out 
there about the situation, and not just the specific information for a certain area of 
analysis. This allows the identification of gaps in the field of knowledge and allows for 
self-organization to fill those gaps. In order to be a truly responsive system, the 
intelligence community has to identify its gaps in knowledge and fix them immediately. 
Outside prompting generally arrives too late to affect the current situation. 
Dr. Andrus further postulates that five technologies (Repository, Wiki, Blog, 
Search, Feedback) comprise a “Technology Stack” which is required to allow the 
intelligence community to start down the path of implementing the five mission 
recommendations (self-organization, tradecraft, information sharing, feedback, and 
strategic communication) suggested by complexity theory.55 The wiki, in Dr. Andrus’ 
view, serves as a means to create a healthy market of debatable ideas that emerges from 
sharing points of view. The ideas that prosper – that is,  the ones that survive the scrutiny 
of the intelligence community – will enable the growth of the adaptive behaviors that the 
intelligence community must adopt in order to respond to the mercurial National Security 
environment.56 Fundamental is the notion that not all good ideas originate at the top (that 
is, longevity and/or expertise are not the sole requirements for creating good ideas), 
which allows the intelligence officer to create a self-organizing community that truly has 
a collaborative analytical capability. 
Dr. Andrus points out that the space must have a sufficiently large critical mass of 
intelligence officers and must be open to not just the intelligence community, but also to 
other non-intelligence elements of national security. Implied here is that the space for 
change must be organization independent. If wedded to organizations, the capacity for 
change is reduced due to bureaucratic cultures and requirements. It is Andrus’ 
 
55 James Moffatt describes Complexity Theory as providing “an explanatory framework of 
interrelationships, both metaphorically and analogously, of how individuals and military organisations 
interact, relate, and evolve within a larger ‘ecosystem.’” James Moffatt, “Complexity Theory and Network 
Centric Operations,” Command and Control Research Program, September 2003, available online at 
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Moffat_Complexity.pdf. 
56 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 20. 
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requirement for accessibility outside of the intelligence community that will enable the 
information sharing and feedback necessary for the intelligence community to adapt to 
changes in the National Security environment. The space also needs to be flexible and 
support the tools for self-organizing (wiki), information sharing (blog), searching, and 
feedback. It needs to be a space that is “always on, ubiquitously distributed, and secure.” 
According to Andrus, this space needs to be an electronic network, and more importantly, 
it needs to be an electronic network based on the SIPRNet.57 
Andrus specifies the need for SIPRNet as a movement away from JWICS and 
toward greater access, stressing the need for the largest possible number of people to 
have access to the tools of the online intelligence community. Andrus feels that JWICS is 
too restrictive to be an effective medium for information sharing. He identifies the 
requirement for accessibility as essential in the creation of reactive intelligence analysis 
capability. The authors agree with Dr. Andrus that greater access is desirable, but they 
feel that SIPRNet is still too restrictive a venue. To ensure the highest degree of 
information sharing, any proposed network should reside on the unclassified NIPRNet. 
Ultimately, Dr. Andrus concludes that as a result of the findings included in the 
9/11 Report, the intelligence community is under pressure (from the public and political 
realms) to adapt to the new operational environment and be successful against the threats 
facing the United States. He argues that ideas such as letting intelligence officers 
independently express their views, creating a body of intelligence knowledge without an 
editor-in-chief, and inviting policy counterparts at the Departments of State, Defense, 
Homeland Security, and other agencies is avant-gard and breathtaking. But these changes 
are timid compared to the changes he argues are required to bring the intelligence 
community into the 21st century.58  
D. BUILDING TRUST 
As noted earlier, the idea of increasing the knowledge capability of institutions by 
coordinating the activities of others is not new. This concept was the basis for the Office 
 
57 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 20. 
58 Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog,” 26. 
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of the Coordinator of Information (COI),59 headed by William Donovan in the early 
stages of World War II. But merely forming an institution to provide that link did not 
solve the issue of increasing knowledge capacity. Ultimately, COI ran into bureaucratic 
resistance from the Departments of War, Navy, and Justice, and in little over a year, was 
split into two organizations, the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS). The result was that both had reduced capabilities and authority. 
Since the development and proliferation of computer networks, physical location 
– while important for establishing initial trust – is no longer a prerequisite for 
collaboration. It is possible to link disparate nodes separated by vast distances and form a 
functional analytical network. But it is important to determine what type of collective 
intelligence is going to form the super-ordinate goal of the analytical network. 
James Surowiecki, in his work “The Wisdom of Crowds,” identifies three types of 
collective intelligence60 that can serve as the basis for a collaborative information 
network. The first type of collective intelligence involves cognition problems, those 
problems that have (or will have) definite solutions. Determining “Who will win the 
Super Bowl this year?” or “How many recruits will graduate basic training?” are both 
examples of this type of problem. But cognition problems can also involve questions for 
which there is no single answer, although some answers are better than others.  Questions 
such as “What is the best way to defeat terrorism?” or “What is the best location for a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team61 (PRT) camp?” would fall into this category. 
The second kind of collective intelligence is coordination problems, that is, those 
problems that require members of a group to figure out how to coordinate their behavior 
with each other, knowing that everyone else is trying to do the same. For example, 
coordinating the patrols of several companies in the military, the interactions of several 
PRTs, or the PSYOP programs for adjacent divisions fall into this arena. The typical 
 
59 Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 90-
94. 
60 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, xvii-xviii. 
61 “PRTs are configured as joint civil-military teams in order to improve civil-military coordination by 
drawing on civilian expertise and facilitating the dispersal of government funds for relief and 
reconstruction projects and security sector reform.”  Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “PRTs in Afghanistan: 
Successful But Not Sufficient,” Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report 2005:6, 12.   
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military (and government) solution for the problem of coordination issues is the use of 
hierarchical organizations – that is, clear cut lines of command where there is a higher 
authority to determine the ultimate outcome after input from subordinate units. The main 
reason for the use of this structure ultimately ends up being accountability for the 
eventual outcome, and thus the ability to affix blame if the outcome is found to be in 
error or disastrous. 
The final type of collective intelligence problem Surowiecki identifies is 
cooperation. Cooperation problems involve the challenge of getting self-interested, 
distrustful people to work together. While Surowiecki states that issues such as paying 
taxes, dealing with pollution, and agreeing on definitions on what counts as reasonable 
pay are examples of cooperation problems, it can also be argued that coming to an 
agreement on definitions in general also falls into this category. The main basis for 
collaborative information requires individuals to agree to a definition that is the “best 
answer” to the question asked.  
Diversity and independence of individuals participating in collaborative 
information networks is important since “the best collective decisions are the product of 
disagreement and contest, not consensus or compromise.”62 Ultimately, the best way for 
a collaborative information group to be smart is for each member to think and act as 
independently as possible. Yet, it also requires that the members of the collaborative 
information group trust the other members of the group.  
Building trust may be easier in a small-scale wiki located within an organization 
or company, as most participants in these wikis have face-to-face contact with the other 
members of the community. Thus, the wiki becomes more of a knowledge repository that 
is accessible 24 hours a day. When a wiki increases in scale, other issues of trust may 
develop as it becomes physically impossible for all the members of the network to meet 
in person. While trust between members doesn’t rely solely on face-to-face contact, such 
contact can be of benefit. 
 
62 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, xix. 
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One goal of wikis is to use collaboration to establish knowledge with the greatest 
veracity, so the environment in which this knowledge development takes place often 
resembles that of scientific discovery. In science, new discoveries are often found 
through the interactions of scientific collaboration, competition, and reputation. When 
scientists collaborate, they do so through a “division of cognitive labor,” due to the fact 
that science has become increasingly specialized and it has become difficult, if not 
impossible, for a single person to know everything he needs to know to solve modern 
science questions. Through collaboration, scientists can incorporate many different kinds 
of knowledge, and can do so in an active way. Collaboration also allows for work on 
inter-disciplinary problems, problems that tend to be the most important in modern 
science.63 
Collaboration also increases efficiency, allowing scientists to be more effective in 
their research efforts. This, coupled with the desire to be the first to solve a problem 
(competition) and the recognition (reputation) that results from success, creates an 
environment conducive to knowledge sharing. There is also the additional pressure of 
publishing one’s ideas for deliberation by the larger community. Often called a “publish 
or perish” motivation, this requirement often fosters the type of sharing required for 
collaborative knowledge. The same principles of competition and reputation apply to 
research in the social sciences. 
So how does trust affect virtual communities? Organizational experts Catherine 
Ridings, David Gefen, and Bay Arinze, in their 2002 work “Some Antecedents and 
Effects of Trust in Virtual Communities,” propose a research model in which trust is the 
mediating variable. This model (Figure 3) seeks to prove that trust is essential in the 
information exchange of virtual communities, as it is in other forms of communications. 
Their model is predicated on the belief that there are three antecedents of trust 
[“Perceived Responsiveness” – (the community responds to requests for information 
from the user); “Other’s Confiding Personal Information” – (other members of the 
community share accurate personal information); “Disposition To Trust” – (the user is 
predisposed to trust)] that affect the two dimensions of trust [“Ability Of Other 
 
63 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, 161-2. 
Members” – (the other members of the community have the knowledge or expertise 
needed to answer the user’s query); “Benevolence/Integrity Of Other Members” –  (the 
other members are sincere about sharing accurate information)]. These two dimensions of 
trust further affected participant desires [“Desire To Give Information” – (the participant 
wants to share further information with the community); “Desire To Get Information” – 
(the participant wants to get knowledge from the community)]64 regarding the knowledge 
network. 
Figure 3.   Ridings, et al., Trust Model65 
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In assessing the validity of their model, Ridings et al, used a cross-sectional 
survey of virtual community members to gauge levels of trust in virtual communities. In 
the course of their study they gathered 663 responses from 36 online communities.66 The 
Partial Least Square (PLS) path coefficients found (Figure 4) highlighted the importance 
of perceived responsiveness towards establishing trust in the virtual community 
                                                 
64 Catherine M. Ridings, David Gefen, and Bay Arinze, “Some Antecedents and Effects of Trust In 
Virtual Communities,” Journal of Strategic Information Systems (vol 11), (Amsterdam, Netherlands: 
Elsevier, 2002), 277. 
65 Ridings, et al., “Some Antecedents,” 277. 
66 Ridings, et al., “Some Antecedents,” 280. 
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(perceived responsiveness had a coefficient of .32 for “Trust In Other’s Ability” and .33 
for “Trust In Other’s Benevolence/Integrity”).67 The old adage “what have you done for 
me lately” would seem to be validated by this result. In a virtual community, performance 
counts more for building trust than either knowing other participants’ personal 
information or the user’s personal disposition to trust. This is also in line with Polish 
sociologist Piotr Sztompka’s assessment on the influence of performance on the 
foundations of trust, which is that actual deeds, present conduct, and currently obtained 
results can be used to determine trustworthiness (Stompka says that this involves 
suspending the past, bracketing the actions, and focusing on what the potential 
beneficiary of trust is doing now).68 Confiding personal information can also relate to 
Sztompka’s notion of performance as it allows an individual to establish a history of 
performance that is linked to identity. Performance can be identified here as contributing 
material that is both relevant and correct. It can be argued that a main issue with trust in 
these communities stems more from the relevance of the posts to the user’s interests. If 
the posts do not further inform the user, the posts are ignored. Additionally, contributors 
may build a reputation for contributing incorrect information and their level of 
community trust can suffer accordingly.  
While Ridings, et al, did not specifically address the issue of clearances, it may be 
possible to extrapolate from the high correlation between perceived responsiveness and 
“Trust In Other’s Benevolence/Integrity.” The relatively open Caterpillar network 
appears to have had a high degree of transparency between members, and one might 
conclude that provides a basis for trusting in other’s benevolence. However, in an 
environment where personnel and activities are obscured by conflicting clearances and 
compartmented information, it is not as easy to determine what other network members 
are doing, or why. As a result, scores for “Trust In Other’s Benevolence/Integrity” and 
perceived responsiveness may suffer, leading to reduced trust across the network. 
 
67 Ridings, et al., “Some Antecedents,” 286. 
68 Sztompka argues that this allows for a much less reliable clue on trustworthiness than reputation, 
because it does not allow for a judgment as to whether trustworthy performance is continuous, typical, and 
“in character.”  This highlights the need to vet personnel participating in virtual communities to make up 
for this perceived flaw. Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 77-79. 
Figure 4.   Research Model With PLS Coefficients69 
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But what this result also enables is the establishment of the idea that one can 
account for the perceptions of “Other’s Confiding Personal Information” and 
“Disposition To Trust” in allowing membership to the knowledge network. If a peer 
community is used as the basis for establishing a knowledge network, the peer 
community, through either personal knowledge or professional accreditation, becomes a 
third party guarantor of the trustworthiness of the knowledge community (Figure 5). In 
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Restricting entry into the participatory side of the knowledge network purely 
through the use of peer groups does not mean that the knowledge network will share 
information freely. Often there are internal motivations and barriers for participation in 
knowledge networks. In their 2003 paper “Motivation and Barriers to Participation in 
Virtual Knowledge-Sharing Communities of Practice,” organizational experts Alexandre 
Ardichvili, Vaughn Page, and Tim Wentling address the issues of motivation and barriers 
to employee participation in a knowledge network at Caterpillar, Inc. The study indicates 
that knowledge flows easily when employees view knowledge as a public good belonging 
to the whole organization. Yet, even when individuals give the highest priority to the 
interests of the organization and of their community (the super-ordinate goal), these 
individuals tend to shy away from contributing knowledge for a variety of reasons.71 
Ardichvili et al., determined that evidence collected for the Caterpiller knowledge 
network pointed to the absence of a major barrier to knowledge sharing known as 
                                                 
70 This modification is based on the Ridings, et al., model, but uses the concept of Peer Groups to 
account for the User Perceptions “Other’s Confiding Personal Info” and “Disposition to Trust.”  Since 
these two factors become requirements for entry, they are accounted for initially and not in the 
determination of the “Basis of Trust.”  
71 Alexander Ardichvili, Vaughn Page, and Tim Wentling, “Motivation and Barriers to Participation in 
Virtual Knowledge-Sharing Communities of Practice,” Journal of Knowledge Management (Vol. 7, No. 1) 
(Boston, MA: Emerald, 2003), 64. 
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“information hoarding”, where knowledge is held to be an individual’s private asset and 
used for competitive advantage. The majority of participants in this study, 55%, believed 
that there was a strong evidence of employees’ willingness to share knowledge with the 
greater community. What was surprising was that less than 10% of the participants 
believed that there were some employees who were unwilling to share knowledge 
because of the “information hoarding” reasons.72 In the intelligence community, the 
compartmented nature of the network lends itself to information hoarding. The members 
of the network may (or may not) wish to share information, but that is irrelevant. By 
design, they cannot. 
The most important barriers to sharing, as determined by Ardichvili, et al., did not 
have anything to do with selfish attempts to hoard the information. Instead, participants 
indicated that, in many cases, they were afraid that what they post may not be important 
or may not deserve to be posted. Additionally, participants also worried that what they 
posted might not be completely accurate or relevant to a specific discussion. Critical 
elements of this fear were avoiding the loss of credibility (what the study termed “fear to 
lose face”), letting their colleagues down, and misleading those colleagues.73 
There was also the impression on the part of the participants that they had to 
“earn” the right to post on the company-wide system, an important indication of the 
importance of authority in terms of tenure and experience in the participants’ 
determination of the value of information. Both new and experienced employees were 
concerned that what they had to say might not be important or relevant enough to share 
with the knowledge network. Some of the participants also voiced a fear of possible 
criticism or ridicule of what they might post. It was this last group that was concerned 
that they may receive responses deriding the value of their contributions.74 
A more fascinating aspect of what was seen as a barrier to the sharing of 
knowledge dealt with way the knowledge network was organized and managed. In the 
Caterpiller case, the process of getting knowledge entries approved by managers was 
 
72 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 68. 
73 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 68. 
74 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 69. 
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“time consuming” (under the company knowledge network guidelines, the community of 
practice managers had to verify the accuracy of entries before allowing their posting on 
the system). This requirement ultimately reduced the responsiveness of the system to the 
needs of the participants, and further, gave the impression that the management (and by 
extension the knowledge network) doubted the value of participant contributions, and 
introduced a bottleneck in the information flow.75 
Additionally, security and confidentiality concerns lead to self-imposed 
censorship by the participants. These participants felt that the knowledge they had, if 
shared, would compromise company secrets, embarrass other employees, or have legal 
ramifications. Some of the users solved this security dilemma by employing older 
methods of knowledge sharing, that is, mailing files to individual coworkers in response 
to their questions posted on the system, giving information over the telephone, or linking 
to personal Web sites. It was for these reasons that some participants avoided using the 
company knowledge network.76 Regarding intelligence networks, the only way to avoid 
security and confidentiality issues is to situate the network on an unclassified, open 
system. For a cultural intelligence community, the data, discussion, and analysis all 
currently exist in open forums. In comparison to either Caterpillar or the existing 
intelligence community, there are no “company secrets” to divulge. 
A major question in their article was “What are the reasons for employees’ 
willingness to use virtual knowledge-sharing communities of practice as a source of new 
knowledge?” While this research team was dealing with a community of practice, defined 
as an “activity system that includes individuals who are united in action and in the  
meaning that action has for them and for the larger collective,”77 it can be argued that the 
results can be used as a basis for predicting behavior in a collaborative intelligence 
community.78 
 
75 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 69. 
76 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 69. 
77 Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 47. 
78 Ardichvili, et al., “Motivation and Barriers,” 69. 
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Since user perceptions of “Other’s Confiding Personal Info” and “Disposition to 
Trust” can be used as determiners for membership in the virtual community, it allows the 
transference of trust in those areas from the individual to the institution (in this case the 
virtual community). In effect: the more one trusts the individuals with whom one 
interacts in a community, the more one will trust the community as a whole. Thus, any 
interactions within the virtual community are evaluated on the basis of “Perceived 
Responsiveness.” This means that one can maintain anonymity in the community, an 
especially important factor given the influence that an individual authority (either 
perceived or actual) has over other people’s desire to share information and extend trust 
to the community. Trust within this anonymous community is now based on assessments 
of the responsiveness of other members of the community. 
This basis of trust on “Perceived Responsiveness” also enables a collaborative 
intelligence community to avoid the pitfalls of the influence of authority on members 
within the community. American sociologist Robert K. Merton described an aspect of 
this with his “Matthew Effect,” in which the relative worth of a scientific paper was 
judged not only on who participated in the research (the more famous the better), but also 
in what order they appeared on the paper as co-authors.79  This can be interpreted as an 
efficiency tool (or heuristic device) by scientists to filter the vast amount of information 
by prioritizing based on reputation, but it means that more relevant work by scientists 
with lower reputations may not be considered in future research endeavors. In a 
knowledge network, the Matthew Effect would prioritize information by the source, not 
by the value, thus destroying credibility to the participants that their contributions are 
valued. 
A drawback of using “Perceived Responsiveness” as a means of determining trust 
is that if the topic that the user is interested in is not a “popular” topic, that is, there is not 
a high enough density of participants who view this topic as one they want to contribute 
to, the user may feel that the network has failed them in this information requirement and 
further degrade their trust in the community. Yet participant non-contribution on the topic 
could be due to a number of factors: they have no information on the topic; they feel their 
 
79 Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, 170. 
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information on the topic is the same as that of the rest of community; they do not trust the 
veracity of their information; they are busy with other matters of higher priority. 
Additionally, the institution can establish the super-ordinate goal of the 
community as the collection of knowledge and that if knowledge is not present it needs to 
be added by the members. By designating this goal up front and making it known to the 
members as a whole, it could counteract the possible degradation of trust by individual 
users within the community. It becomes a requirement of membership within this 
collaborative community to identify holes in the knowledge database and attempt to fix 
them. 
But, the establishment of a super-ordinate goal alone will not avoid all the 
problems of conducting collective intelligence analysis. Simply put, there are topics that, 
by their very nature, can divide a community and thus initiate an editing conflict between 
two opposing opinions. These topics tend to be subjects that, in the words of American 
anthropologist Anna Simons, involve “internally consistent logic” (ICL).80 These 
subjects often involve points where either matters of faith are called into question or there 
is a lack of credible, quantifiable evidence to support a conclusion. An excellent example 
of this can be seen with the definition of “evolution” on Wikipedia (Figure 6). Between 
December 2001 and October 2005, 68 editors participated in the debate over an adequate 
definition of “evolution,” a debate that resulted in 2,081 alterations.81  
 
80 Anna Simons, “Internally Consistent Logic,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
February 28, 2007). 
81 Susan Kruglinski, “Map: Evolution Evolving – A Very Public Online Fracas,” 
DiscoverMagazine.com, http://discovermagazine.com/2006/jul/evolutionmap (accessed May 4, 2007). 






While this level of alterations shows that a healthy debate on the topic existed, it 
also highlights two issues: (1) If the topic is not “popular,” it will not be altered as much, 
possibly resulting in more errors that are not initially corrected; (2) Topics that involve 
subjects that cannot be proved beyond a reasonable measure of a doubt can fuel debates 
that can devolve into ad hominem attacks on the contributors and their ideas.  
It is apparent that editing Wikipedia has become a popular pastime. Still, half of 
all vandalisms (deletions and malicious content) are corrected within five minutes. 
However, if the vandalism occurs with a topic that is not popular (in terms of contributors 
or users), the vandalism may exist for a longer period of time before it is caught. A 
famous instance of this with Wikipedia was with the malicious biographical entry for 
“John Seigenthaler, Sr.” that existed for 132 days before it was caught – in this case by 
                                                 
82 Kruglinski, “Map: Evolution Evolving.”  
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the son of the subject.83 Another instance of Wikipedia vandalism was initiated by 
Stephen Colbert, anchor of the mock news show “The Colbert Report,” who in the 
summer of 2006 encouraged his viewers to add false information on the topic of 
elephants.84 
Ultimately, in order for a knowledge network to succeed, it needs to be seen as 
being trustworthy and responsive to the needs of the users and participants. While it is 
beneficial to control the number of participants (as opposed to the Wikipedia example, 
which potentially has an unlimited number of contributors), especially in areas that 
require higher levels of veracity of information (intelligence, science), restricting the 






83 John Seigenthaler, “A False ‘Wikipedia’ Biography,” USAToday.com, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-11-29-wikipedia-edit_x.htm (accessed March 5, 
2007). 
84 Alexa Vaughn, “Educators weighing in on Wikipedia: Potential Legislation, Some Schools’ 
Policies Aim To Limit Web Site’s Application As A Research Tool,” DailyBruin.UCLA.edu, 
http://www.dailybruin.ucla.edu/news/2007/feb/20/educators_weighing_wikipedia/ (accessed May 8, 2007). 
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IV. EXISTING CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES 
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
There is a lack of capacity within DoD to accomplish cultural intelligence work. 
This is implied by cultural intelligence’s absence in military doctrine, and further 
corroborated by Anthropologist Anna Simons: 
No organization within the U.S. government’s vast intelligence system 
currently gathers information about indigenous forms of association, local 
means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization.  Yet, ties 
built through kinship connections, tribal relationships, religious education, 
and other forms of normal, everyday association remain available to our 
adversaries throughout the non-western world as ready-made means of 
recruitment, communication, resourcing, and support.  Worse, in addition 
to doubling as latent networks, these indigenous institutions offer ideal 
cover.  They comprise the social fabric most places; they are as familiar 
and comfortable as the neighborhoods in which people grow up.  And they 
are completely unfamiliar to us.85 
The only military agency that appears to be consistently dedicating any assets to 
the development of cultural intelligence is the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 
(MCIA) which has a new “Cultural Intelligence Program” (CIP). They are in the process 
of fleshing out their cultural database. The following passage is representative of their 
method: 
The Afghanistan Culture Guide represents our first wiki effort and we 
intend to have all our Culture Guides and Field Guides on Intellipedia 
within a few months.   We have active pages up on SIPR and JWICS 
Intelink sites and will replicate all our wikis when they become available. 
Please invite any experts you know to provide researched and referenced 
additions or changes.86 
This appears to be one of the first instances in recent history where cultural intelligence 
has been deemed important enough to address in a dedicated forum. Unfortunately, it still 
 
85 Anna Simons, “Improving Human Intelligence in the War on Terrorism: The Need For An 
Ethnographic Capability,” (internal report to OSD/Net Assessment, Department of Defense Analysis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006), 2. 
86 Alfred B. Connable, Major U.S. Army, e-mail message to author, February 2, 2007. 
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resides on SIPR and JWICS, so their call for contributions from experts may lead to 
limited success – only experts with clearances can participate. 
Other entities currently exist that conduct intelligence operations with a limited 
cultural aspect. For instance, the Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) of the 4th 
Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina provides 
cultural intelligence for Psychological Operations forces in particular and Special 
Operations Forces in general. But the work of this detachment is often classified and 
sometimes requires personal communications with the SSD itself. Additionally, the SSD 
is a relatively small organization that cannot meet the cultural intelligence needs of the 
entire United States Government. It is often possible to gain information on local 
conditions in foreign areas from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of 
State, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the Library of Congress, and the 
US Information Agency (USIA),87 but no existing network links all these nodes with 
other nodes of cultural information. 
The military is also striving to utilize contractors to provide Cultural Intelligence 
support. Utilizing commercial sources allows competition to deliver a product at the best 
price possible, but is it necessarily the best cultural intelligence available? The product 
that is delivered may be, in the end, not cultural intelligence, but cultural awareness. The 
business community has defined cultural intelligence (and abbreviated it as “CQ”) as “the 
ability to cope with national, corporate and vocational cultures,”88 but this definition is 
more appropriate to the guides on etiquette given in travel books, in essence, cultural 
awareness. Cultural awareness is definitely needed in military operations, but it is not the 
level of analysis or information needed for Special Operations or Information Operations 
to adequately engage foreign populations in order to accomplish mission goals. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, there is a gulf of difference between cultural information and 
cultural intelligence. 
 
87 Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., Psychological Operations: Principles and Case 
Studies (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 35-36, 82-83, 203-204. 
88 Value Based Management, “Cultural Intelligence,” ValueBasedManagement.net, 
http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/ methods_earley_cultural_intelligence.html (accessed April 26, 
2006). 
 41
                                                
Furthermore, an over-reliance on contractors reduces the ability of the military to 
have a competitive cultural intelligence environment. Contractors are paid according to 
the amount of support they provide, and they are expensive. They are thus not motivated 
to utilize outside sources or competitors to fine-tune their analysis. What is needed is an 
environment where participants can provide cultural intelligence in a manner that is 
readily accessible, timely, and accurate. Not only do wikis provide access to a wider 
community of experts than found in contractor offerings, but they do so at a dramatically 
reduced cost. 
The fluid nature of cultural intelligence and the relative availability of open 
source information allow it to be dealt with in a wider variety of ways than is possible 
with classified information. For instance, the military is developing computer programs 
and databases to increase cultural intelligence capabilities across the armed forces. 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) at U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(USJFCOM) is developing simulation and modeling tools to help in conducting cultural 
intelligence. Additionally, the Joint Psychological Support Element (JPSE) at U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is working on the Cultural Attitudinal 
Database (CAD), while USSOCOM is developing the Cultural Preparation of the 
Environment (CPE) project. The Department of the Army is also trying to assist the 
development of cultural intelligence with the development of Mapping the Human 
Terrain (MAP/HT).89 But what is lacking is a collaborative, professional environment in 
which civilians and military personnel can interact and provide cultural intelligence to the 
community at large. 
It is telling that the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms defines culture as “A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. 
Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad 
sense, all names and legends on a map.”90 Culture is simply specialized terrain features 
that enable the military to determine its location in order to conduct its mission. This 
 
89 John Condroski, e-mail message to author, April 17, 2006. 
90 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 16, 2006), 137.  
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definition removes the human aspect of culture and also reinforces the idea that culture is 
static and can be precisely located and defined. This point of view is misleading, and 
some military professionals have found a way to step beyond this narrow view. That need 
is addressed in this somewhat more nuanced description from Commander John P. Coles 
(USN), who writes in IO Sphere, “Cultural intelligence can be defined as analyzed social, 
political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a 
people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and 
behaviors.”91 He states explicitly in his explanation of the definition that the concepts of 
analysis and evaluation are what differentiates “cultural intelligence” from “culture.” 
While Coles doesn’t address the macro issues of culture, such as duration, intra-cultural 
variety, and so on, he does appear to have a valid concept. Most of the other cultural 
thinkers in the following pages touch on one or more of the items on Coles’ list, which 
lends credence to his selections. As Coles is obviously concerned with the operational 
and tactical implications of cultural analysis, his selection of cultural traits are most 
useful to him simply because they are the ones he will most frequently encounter. 
B. ACADEMICS 
The broad academic community provides the basis for describing and explaining 
cultural intelligence, and for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to adopt a position 
on the nature of culture. That position cannot be framed through analysis of military 
writings on the subject, but must be developed from the wealth of academic knowledge 
available. Attempting to settle on a specific definition of culture would be 
counterproductive. Rather, one must analyze several viewpoints on culture, with an eye 
toward what they offer in the construction of a cultural community, as well as what they 
lack. A survey of different authors’ viewpoints on culture is also illustrative of the variety 
and debate necessary in a cultural intelligence community – and of its ready availability 
in academe. 
British anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor defines culture as “That complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
 
91 John P. Coles, Commander U.S. Navy, “Incorporating Cultural Intelligence Into Joint Doctrine,” IO 
Sphere (Spring 2006), 7. 
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capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”92  This is a fairly broad 
definition, resting at the civilizational level. While it is possible to use this set to evaluate 
a culture, it is sometimes important to take a slightly more theoretical stance, and look 
also at the foundation of the attributes themselves. Analysis not only requires answering 
the questions “What do members of this society do?” and “How do members of this 
society function?” but also frequently demands answering the question “Why do members 
of this society do what they do?” It is that “why” that seems to be left unasked by Tylor.  
The 19th century German sociologist Maximilian (Max) Weber maintains that:  
The concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes 
‘culture’ to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes 
those segments and only those segments of reality which have become 
significant to us because of this value-relevance.93  
This definition remains in the more general and theoretical realm, as opposed to delving 
into the details that preoccupy so many other writers. There is, of course, nothing wrong 
with this approach. In fact, it offers a framework into which many different cultural 
paradigms may fit. If anything, it is the closest thing to a usable concept available. Rather 
than push culture into a form designated by a researcher, it allows – or even requires – 
culture to retain its original state, and further requires the researcher to accept that fact. It 
would appear to be the ultimate embodiment of agnosticism in cultural relativity, in the 
strictest sense of the term “cultural relativity.” 
American anthropologist Ruth Benedict contends “Society in its full sense . . . is 
never an entity separable from the individuals who compose it. No individual can arrive 
even at the threshold of his potentialities without a culture in which he participates. 
Conversely, no civilization has in it any element which is not the contribution of an 
individual. Where else could any [cultural] trait come from except from the behavior of a 
man or a woman or a child?”94 This is frequently oversimplified to read “Culture is 
 
92 Felix M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), 18. 
93 Richard Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 56. 
94 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), 253. 
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personality writ large.”95 While she doesn’t attempt to strictly define culture, Benedict 
adds that man shapes culture and culture shapes man. This concept – of culture and man 
being functions of the other, and of the fluid nature of each – is important to bear in mind 
while attempting to evaluate cultures. Updating one’s understanding of cultures based on 
changes over time is paramount to maintaining clear cultural analysis. Benedict goes on 
to say that “There has never been a time when civilization stood more in need of 
individuals who are genuinely culture-conscious, who can see objectively the socially 
conditioned behavior of other peoples without fear and recrimination.”96 This highlights 
the need to remain non-biased, and touches on the cultural relativism implied in Weber’s 
treatment. 
American anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn describes culture as “[All the] 
historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and non-
rational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of men.”97 
While Kluckhohn’s description resembles Tylor’s in its use of a detailed list, it does so 
from a “mindful” perspective. This is idea that the “designs for living” may not be 
explicitly stated (or even explicitly understood) by the culture itself, and that they may 
appear irrational (perhaps to both cultural insiders and outsiders). This is further 
reinforcement of the need to apply cultural relativism, and to strive for an objective 
understanding of the “why” question. 
Another American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, says “The concept of culture I 
espouse . . . is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social 
expressions on their surface enigmatical.”98 It is an extremely rich, yet still flexible, point 
 
95 Clyde Kluckhohn, “Southwestern Studies of Culture and Personality” in American Anthropologist, 
New Series, Vol. 56, No. 4, Southwest Issue (August 1954), 694. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici? 
sici=0002-7294%28195408%292%3A56%3A4%3C685%3ASSOCAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M (accessed 
February 12, 2007). 
96 Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 10-11. 
97 Keesing, Cultural Anthropology, 18. 
98 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), 5. 
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of view. It offers some possibilities for shaping general thoughts on culture, as well as the 
community (or web) in which culture will be considered. 
American political scientist Samuel Huntington writes that “Civilization and 
culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ 
large. They both involve the ‘values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking to which 
successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance.’”99 
Huntington offers no elaboration on the content of culture, but he adds a temporal 
component to the equation. His contribution is the concept of duration, but he tempers it 
with the implication of change over time, as well. It is this durational/malleable quality 
that closes the loop for us on the question “What is culture?”  
These descriptions illustrate the contentious nature of defining culture, that one’s 
viewpoint is often determined by one’s academic background and/or practical 
experiences. Each definition, while not representing the absolute definition of culture, 
illuminates an important aspect of culture that must be addressed. Thus, the various 
definitions support the need for a forum that allows for the discussion and debate of 
mutual viewpoints within the topic of culture. While there may be some discussion of the 
nature of culture itself, such discussion is not necessary to support the community’s 
goals. 
It is important to bear in mind that this disparate group of imminent thinkers does 
not precisely agree on the nature of culture. It is that disagreement which supports more 
thorough, insightful analysis of cultural factors. Further, this does not mean that culture 
cannot be defined, it simply means that culture is not definable along one line of 
reasoning – nor does it need to be. The diversity of definitions of culture implies the need 
to employ a diverse group of contributors to build a successful virtual community. 
Lacking a variety of opinions, any such attempt is likely to fail. The strength in a 
community lies in its ability to cover many of the wide range of aspects of a culture under 
study.  
 
99 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 41. 
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Just as culture does not conform to a single definition, the same can be said of 
cultural intelligence, the content of which varies according to the culture being studied 
and the information desired from the study of that culture. Likely, the best technique is to 
allow – or even encourage – community members to contribute based on their 
understanding of culture. Each specialty has its own way of looking at culture, every one 
just as valid as another. This framework allows for the fusion of multiple aspects of 
culture within the same database, without pinning community members to something that 
doesn’t fit their analytical model. 
But why is the academic community so important to this effort? Why can the 
military not just rely on highly-trained servicemembers to provide the cultural framework 
and analysis? The importance of the academic community, though counterintuitive, is for 
a very simple reason: variety. The academic community, being representative of widely 
divergent (but equally relevant) opinions, may be the best place to start when building a 
foundation in cultural intelligence. It is important to include academia as a resource, 
rather than avoid it due to what may appear to be chaos to an outsider. That “chaos” is 
simply the noisy interplay of developing and establishing theory. Compare that to the 
military, which tends to operate and deliberate along established lines of reasoning 
(doctrine, TTP, etc). Ultimately, it is the analysis of cultural properties – and their effect 
on operations – that CI requires, and academia is currently the best source for this skill.  
C. CASUAL EXPERTS 
Wikipedia is a prime example of a broad field of casual experts coming together 
to provide insight on an ever-expanding array of topics. While there has been some 
attempt to compare Wikipedia with a standard “hard-bound” encyclopedia, the 
comparison is bound to fail. Standard encyclopedias have limited space, limited time 
prior to publication, limited funds to hire researchers, limited ability to address evolving 
topics, and so on. The key concept for them is “limited.”  Wikipedia, on the other hand, 
does not have limited space, has no publication timeline, does not pay its authors for their 
contributions, has endless ability to address evolving topics, and so on. 
The fact is, casual experts, or hobbyists, are the key to the success of any broad 
community. Wherever an expert opinion is required, there exists at least one individual 
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with knowledge of that information set. Whether it is the grammarian who can see errors 
from across the room, the grandmother who spent the better part of her life in India, or 
the Special Operations Soldier who has deployed again and again to South America, they 
all have key roles to play. These are the bedrock assets of the virtual community. They 
know the information because they like to know it – it interests them. They take part 
because they enjoy it – it is not a job, but rather a challenge.100 The challenge is being to 
make the information as “right” as possible based on their real-world experience. 
Casual experts may offer something else, as well: the ability to drill deeper into 
arguments espoused by the academic community. While the academic community as a 
whole has a great deal of variety, individual academics can be insular. The casual expert 
may tend to be less “wedded” to a particular concept, may have more of a tendency to be 
interested in a range of topics, and thus may be able to make connections (between 
seemingly unrelated concepts) that others may miss. Casual experts can have greater 
access to real-time, real-world information as there are greater numbers of them and 
therefore, better access to a wide variety of experiences. Michael Handel describes these 
casual experts as amateurs, but regardless of title, their contributions remain worthwhile: 
Amateurs frequently bring with them new enthusiasm, a creative 
imagination, informality, perhaps some academic openness, and a 
somewhat more detached and objective search for veritas – all of which 
are intellectual qualities highly useful for intelligence work in general and 
deception work in particular. This fresh start allows them to reexamine old 
problems from a new point of view, unlike the pre-war professional 
intelligence bureaucrats: they were not obligated to commit themselves to 
earlier, not always fully rational, traditions or to old policies.101 
Members of diaspora communities may also fall into the casual expert category. 
They, more than anyone else, can access the nuances of a target culture – from inside 
jokes to social faux pas – better than even the most well-trained non-native cultural 
expert. This applies even to the point of being able to make the “right” mistakes. Native 
 
100 Willinsky describes the Wikipedia entry on “Mister Jip,” a fictional comic book character: “. . . the 
expertise on Mister Jip appears to lie entirely in the hands of the 13 contributors to this entry, without need 
for outside sources.”  John Willinsky, “What open access research can do for Wikipedia,” 
FirstMonday.Org, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_3/willinsky (accessed May 8, 2007). 
101 Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, 
eds. J. Gooch and A. Perlmutter, et al. (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 140. 
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members of a culture make different mistakes than non-natives, and while they may not 
be able to put their finger on exactly what the problem is with a non-native who is 
attempting to “pass,” native members are certain he is not one of them. 
D. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING INTELLIGENCE PARADIGMS 
Outside of the comparative dearth of cultural intelligence resources in DoD today, 
there are some other key considerations for any potential cultural intelligence consumer. 
To begin with, what does the DoD consider cultural intelligence to be? How flexible is 
the U.S. government in allowing subordinates to apply their own cultural intelligence 
methodologies? What organizations can be counted on to assist in developing cultural 
intelligence? Does new doctrine address any of the bases for good cultural intelligence? 
What is the role of classified intelligence in the process, as opposed to the role of 
OSINT? 
How does the military currently understand cultural intelligence to be? Implied in 
the DoD definition of culture is the concept of cultural intelligence as the analysis of 
man-made terrain features. That seems woefully inadequate, but fortunately there is more 
opinion available. Unfortunately, it too, appears to be inadequate. Presently, for example, 
members of the 25th Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade are serving in Kirkuk, Iraq. CPT 
Elliot Olmstead, the Brigade’s Assistant Intelligence Officer, relates his experience with 
cultural intelligence as consisting of two weeks of cultural awareness training prior to 
entering the country. In his words, he and his Soldiers were instructed on “how to run 
check points, how to separate women and children, how not to touch the Koran, or have 
women searched by men . . .” Since beginning operations he has developed his own 
understanding of cultural intelligence, which consists very basically of “understanding 
the cultural implications of activity, [and] how the populace sees it, versus the 
Coalition.”102 What is evident is that there is a haphazard patchwork of individual 
opinion on cultural intelligence, that has developed in the absence of any overarching 
guidance from DoD. 
Returning to CDR Coles, one can see that he was forced to devise his own 
working definition of cultural intelligence after determining the official DoD definition to 
 
102 Elliot Olmstead, Captain U.S. Army, e-mail message to author, December 11, 2006. 
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be insufficient. Coles’ belief that analysis and evaluation of culture – however one 
defines culture – may be useful here. There are two sides to this coin: what is considered 
important enough to concentrate research attention on; and what the end user deems 
necessary for the successful completion of his mission. 
The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 titled “Counterinsurgency,” though 
newly revised, only serves to reinforce the lack of emphasis on culture within the rest of 
the U.S. DoD. In fact, the most comprehensive definition yet available in U.S. doctrine 
appears to be contained in its pages: 
3-37. Culture is “web of meaning” shared by members of a particular 
society or group within a society. (See FM 3-05.301/MCRP 3-40.6A.) 
Culture is— 
• A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and 
artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and 
with one another. 
• Learned, though a process called enculturation. 
• Shared by members of a society; there is no “culture of one.” 
• Patterned, meaning that people in a society live and think in ways 
forming definite, repeating patterns. 
• Changeable, through social interactions between people and 
groups. 
• Arbitrary, meaning that Soldiers and Marines should make no 
assumptions regarding what a society considers right and wrong, 
good and bad. 
• Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and 
perceived as “natural” by people within the society.103 
This description of culture is on par with many of those offered by civilian cultural 
experts, and may be a sign of positive developments in the military’s understanding of 
the value of culture and cultural intelligence. 
                                                 
103 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, 3-6 – 3-7. 
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Chapter 3 – Intelligence in Counterinsurgency – is devoted to the requirements for 
intelligence support for counterinsurgency operations. However, this chapter reveals that 
there is no institutional support available for conducting an analysis of culture by 
intelligence assets. Paragraph 3-9 states that in the development of the Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) for Counterinsurgency: 
Whenever possible, personnel must conduct a very thorough and detailed 
IPB in preparation for deployment. IPB in COIN requires intelligence 
personnel to work in areas such as economics, anthropology, and 
governance that may be outside their expertise. Therefore, integrating 
staffs and drawing upon the knowledge of non-intelligence personnel and 
external subject matter experts with local and regional knowledge are 
critical to effective unit preparation.104  
Limited staffs with limited training trying to tackle an unbounded issue (local culture) 
results in the production of “Fodor’s Guides” – checklists of cultural traits that apply to 
large regions but do not readily lend themselves to fully understanding the local populace 
and effectively engaging them in psychological warfare. 
Additionally, paragraph 3-10 goes on to state that: 
If there are already units deployed in theater, these are the best potential 
sources of intelligence available. Deploying units should make an effort to 
reach forward to units in theater. Governmental agencies such as the 
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and 
intelligence agencies are often able to provide country studies and other 
background information on a theater. Open-source intelligence is also very 
important to pre-deployment IPB. In many cases, background information 
on the populace, cultures, languages, history, and government of an AO 
may be found in open sources. These include books, magazines, 
encyclopedias, Web sites, tourist maps, and atlases. Academic sources, 
such as journal articles and university professors, can also be of great 
benefit.105  
The results of such a process are superficial compendiums that further emphasize the lack 
of a cultural analytical capability within DoD and the lack of desire on the part of the 
intelligence community to fully develop this field as a viable mission for intelligence 
personnel. 
 
104 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, 3-2. 
105 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, 3-2. 
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An additional risk of asking the existing intelligence community to conduct 
cultural analysis is that, when pressed for time, tactical analysts will most likely use their 
cognitive filters to streamline the process, thereby degrading the value of the resulting 
cultural intelligence.106 One positive effect of operating in a resource-constrained 
environment, especially with regard to time, is that it forces the analyst to discount the 
issue of their personal level of trust of the source of cultural intelligence. People will 
ultimately go where they need to, to get information, regardless of whether they trust or 
like someone.107 
There are obstacles for including academics in conducting cultural intelligence 
analysis for the military, primarily the lack of trust on the part of the academic 
community when it comes to conducting research for the U.S. government. This distrust 
is notably evident in the anthropology community, a field that is felt to be the only 
academic discipline that explicitly seeks to understand foreign cultures and societies. 
Anthropology has historically been – and could again become – a major contributor to the 
U.S. national security policy, in both foreign policy and special operations. However, due 
to deep isolationist tendencies which have evolved within the community over the past 
several decades, anthropologists have been reluctant to work with the military. 
This atmosphere of distrust of military research is fostered by the anthropologists’ 
professional organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA). The 
AAA’s current “Statement of Professional Responsibility” goes so far as to say: 
Anthropologists should undertake no secret research or any research 
whose results cannot be freely derived and publicly reported . . . No secret 
research, no secret reports, or debriefings of any kind should be agreed to 
or given.108 
 
106 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 82-156. 
107 Cross and Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks, 97. 
108 Montgomery McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious 
Relationship” in Joint Center for Operational Analysis (Quarterly Bulletin), Vol. VIII, Issue 3, Southwest 
Issue (September 2006), 72. 
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This guidance reflects a widely held view among anthropologists that “any research 
undertaken for the military is de facto evil and ethically unacceptable.”109 It also serves 
to further isolate the military from experts in the field of culture at a time when the 
military is one of the main aspects of American government and society that is in contact 
with foreign cultures. The emphasis on “secret” in the AAA’s “Statement” might indicate 
that opportunities to exist to entice their membership to conduct unclassified research.  
Other academic communities are not as “hard line” on their willingness to work 
with government agencies. The Council on Foreign Relations,110 for instance, includes 
various members of the U.S. government on its boards and panels, which lessens the risk 
of homophily on the part of the Council. However, the analytical capability of the 
Council in terms of cultural issues is not readily available due to a lack of connectivity 
between the Council and the consumers of cultural intelligence. Meanwhile, there are 
concerns about whether analysis based on open-source intelligence (OSINT) is accurate 
or applicable to SOF cultural intelligence requirements.  
Currently, the intelligence community harbors some institutional prejudice against 
OSINT, as it seems to run counter to the purposes for which the intelligence community 
was created.111 Some members of the intelligence professions mistakenly equate the 
degree of difficulty involved in obtaining information with its ultimate value to analysts 
and policymakers.112 To much of the intelligence community, intelligence is about 
discovering secrets – so the fact that a certain piece of information is classified further 
adds to its validity. Many hold the mistaken belief that the classification level of 
information or analysis is an important aspect of the data – that the higher the 
classification, the more valuable the data is. This perception presents another obstacle to 
overcome in creating an open-source based cultural intelligence wiki.  
Another challenge to creating a wiki-based cultural intelligence community is the 
overabundance of information. OSINT, however, has the potential to outstrip all other  
109 McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency,” 72. 
110 Council on Foreign Relations, “Council on Foreign Relations,” CFR.Org, http://www.cfr.org/ 
(accessed December 14, 2006). 
111 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 79. 
112 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 103.  
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collection techniques in the quantity and quality of intelligence information due to the 
shear amount of information that is available.113 Against this is a principle that Cialdini 
discusses, which is the idea of scarcity.114 Open-source intelligence is as abundant as 
sand on a beach, so it is sometimes considered nearly worthless. Classified intelligence, 
however, is much less available – both in the sense of quantity and accessibility – and so 
is considered much more desirable. The concept “the harder it is to get, the more it is 
worth,” while suitable for pricing raw commodities or goods, discounts the value that 
analysis imparts to information. In this case, “difficulty of acquisition” may also refer to 
the level of classification of the information. In real terms, both classified and open-
source information must be “mined” for suitable content – which must then be analyzed 
to produce intelligence – and the idea that one is better than the other based merely on 
scarcity is an untenable point of view.  
Advocates of OSINT hold that if publicly acquired information is properly 
organized and analyzed, a potential goldmine of intelligence information exists that could 
rival the intelligence gained from other, more clandestine intelligence disciplines. 
Proponents cite the fact that due to the greater openness and transparency of political and 
economic systems throughout the world, 80% of all intelligence information can be 
gleaned from open-source materials. In the realm of economic intelligence alone, 95% of 
the information comes from open sources.115 Moreover, OSINT can put classified 
intelligence into a wider context, thereby amplifying the value of the classified 
intelligence in determining trends for policy makers.116 
In sum, supporters of OSINT hold that the true value of information comes from 
its analysis. Analysis is made better by offering the data to a wider group of interested 




113 Michael A. Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 93. 
114 Cialdini, Influence, 237-271. 
115 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 93. 
116 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 102. 
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E. THE TWO EXTREMES: WIKIPEDIA AND INTELINK 
In addressing current virtual collaboration resources, it is insightful to look at two 
divergent examples: Wikipedia and Intelink. 
Wikipedia exemplifies how a broad community of disparate thinkers can come 
together to provide useful information that, with some exceptions, is highly reliable. Its 
downfall is that it can be too open; anyone can sign up for an account and (in the 
extremes) either provide singularly expert input or wreak havoc with existing data. 
Individuals and organizations may exhibit an unwillingness to use it because the 
information may be suspect and thus its very openness serves to deter people from 
relying on its data.117 
A more conventional version of an online encyclopedia – called Nupedia – had 
existed since March of 2000, and had an “elaborate system of peer review and required 
many highly qualified contributors, but the writing of articles was seen as very slow,”118 
and this process ultimately restricted the amount of information available and its 
usefulness to the consumer.119 It was this effect on the flow of information that caused 
Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger – two people who had worked on the Nupedia project – 
to get together in 2000 to “discuss various ways to supplement Nupedia with a more 
open, complementary project.”120 The two met with a computer programmer – Ben 
Kovitz – on January 2, 2001. On January 10, 2001, Nupedia’s wiki was launched under 
 
117 The history department at Middlebury College in Vermont announced a policy forbidding students 
from citing Wikipedia articles in research papers, stating “Wikipedia is not an acceptable citation, even 
though it may lead one to a citable source.”  Alexa Vaughn, “Educators Weighing In On Wikipedia: 
Potential Legislation, Some Schools’ Policies Aim to Limit Web Site’s Application As A Research Tool,” 
DailyBruin.UCLA.Edu, http://www.dailybruin.ucla.edu/news/2007/feb/20/educators_weighing_wikipedia/ 
(accessed May 8, 2007). 
118 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed February 11, 2007). 
119 “Nupedia was based on solicited articles going through a seven-step review process (much like 
traditional encyclopedias), but by the end of its first year had only 200 articles before floundering. 
Wikipedia, on the other hand, had 20,000 articles added in its first year.”  John Willinsky, “What Open 
Access Research Can Do For Wikipedia,” FirstMonday.Org, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_3/ 
willinsky (accessed May 8, 2007). 
120 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
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the name “Wikipedia.”121 The original group of Nupedia editors and reviewers were 
resistant to the more liberal wiki format, so Wikipedia was relaunched on January 15, 
2001, on its own domain – wikipedia.com. The points to take from this are: from 
conception to initiation of planning took something less than one year, and from initiation 
of planning to physical implementation took eight days. The technical and funding 
aspects are equally telling: Nupedia’s founder, Jimmy Wales, donated the initial 
bandwidth and servers, and Wikipedia’s “seed” content was provided by the Nupedia 
online encyclopedia project.122 
Sanger and Wales also addressed concerns about ownership of content: All the 
text in Wikipedia, and most of the images and other content, is covered by the GNU Free 
Documentation License (GFDL). Contributions remain the property of their creators, 
while the GFDL ensures content will remain freely distributable and reproducible.123 
Solving the issue of copyright and content ownership holds a key position in encouraging 
the success of any sort of wiki: academics – or anyone who wishes to publish – might be 
deterred from sharing their original insights in a more or less “open” forum if they cannot 
be guaranteed ownership of their own material. If anyone else can pick up their “thread” 
without attribution, there is no motivation to contribute anything of substance. Rather, 
those potential high-value contributors might hold back their best effort for their own 
benefit, thereby closing (or never even opening) alternative avenues of approach to points 
of cultural intelligence with which the community is dealing. 
Counter to what one might expect, the high-profile pages that generate a lot of 
interest tend to be the most “correct” of all due to consistent monitoring by experts of all 
stripes. The less well-read pages – though not incorrect – could be more correct than they 
are. That is to be expected when only a handful of analysts edit the page, maintaining 
their cognitive filters and homophily. 
 
121 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
122 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
123 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed February 11, 2007). 
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In contrast, Intelink is supposed to be manned by vetted members of the 
intelligence community, whose authority is not to be questioned. Intelink suffers its own 
difficulties, though. First off, the bulk of “good” information is behind a classified wall, 
so the vast majority of potential contributors cannot get access to it – either to debunk it 
or to build on it. Another impediment is that it is on a “.gov” domain, so many academics 
who qualify for participation might opt out. Further, entry into the community implies 
one’s ability to successfully undergo a background check in order to receive access to a 
secure computer network. Why would that be necessary? Because the “Remote Access 
Password” is emailed to the user’s SIPR email account (which one cannot get without 
first having a clearance), as opposed to his unclassified email account. A further downfall 
for Intelink is related to homophily – most of those who do qualify for participation have 
already self-selected for membership in government activities such as the military, other 
government agencies, and so on. Because of this, they may be more alike than a typical 
cross section of non-government experts, thereby skewing their analysis.  
Intelink also does not have any means to link documents to one another. Analyst’s 
postings do not include hyperlinks, even to reports they cite. It further lacks the sort of 
“social” ranking that helps Google stand out – the idea that the more people link to a web 
object, the more important it must be.124 That social linking concept can – and has been – 
abused for profit or personal gain in the public sector, but remains relevant as a tool to 
determine the relative worth of a web object. Intelink has been rated a relative success 
based on its number of edits. Prior to Christmas 2006, there were approximately 2000 
edits on Intelink documents. That had grown to 3500 edits just after Christmas of 2006, 
and up to approximately 4500 edits currently. This suggests a lack of information 
scrutiny and a dearth of overall interest in the content of Intellink. 
Of further concern is Intelink’s framing through document selection. Framing 
refers to the method in which something is presented (data, in this case) and how that 
presentation affects the audience’s use of the data. Intelink was “seeded” with documents 
from the C.I.A. World Fact Book, but these documents are basically finished products, 
 
124 Clive Thompson, “Open-Source Spying,” NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/ 
magazine/03intelligence.html?ex=1177041600&en=cc5544227fb7ff9d&ei=5070 (accessed December 10, 
2006). 
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with the implication as such that they require no further input to be usable. This suggests 
that Intelink does value the collaborative debate that editing creates, but has not taken full 
advantage of it. 
Compare this to Intellipedia, which was founded in the fall of 2005. Intellipedia 
sprung from Intelink, and includes much of Intelink’s existing pages (works from the 
C.I.A. World Fact Book), as well as a large number of pages lifted directly from 
Wikipedia. Intellipedia thus combines both classified and un-classified information. Any 
intelligence employee with a classified clearance can read and contribute to it.125 By the 
fall of 2006, over 3,600 members of the intelligence services had contributed a total of 
28,000 pages.126 The downfall with Intellipedia is the classified nature of the network. 
Again, it artificially limits access to those with the requisite access – who may not be the 
best analysts to maximize the intelligence value to be gained from inspection of the 
material. Intellipedia shares the same problem with framing as does Intelink, which is the 
implication that the data present is already complete. Again, this serves to discourage 
further editing. 
The key to understanding the value of Intelink’s and Intellipedia’s numbers is a 
comparison to the bellweather of wiki success: Wikipedia. The relative success of this 
loose-format, open-source wiki is best described by Wikipedia’s own (constantly revised) 
history: 
There are over 75,000 active contributors working on more than 5,300,000 
articles in more than 100 languages. As of today [March 7, 2007], there 
are 1,675,631 articles in English; every day hundreds of thousands of 
visitors from around the world make tens of thousands of edits and create 
thousands of new articles to enhance the amount of knowledge held by the 
Wikipedia encyclopedia. Visitors do not need any specialised 
qualifications to contribute, since their primary role is to write articles that 
cover already-existing knowledge, and people of all ages can therefore 
write Wikipedia articles.127 
 
125 Thompson, “Open-Source Spying.”   
126 Thompson, “Open-Source Spying.”  
127 Wikipedia, “Wikipedia: About,” En.Wikipedia.Org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
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Visitors to wikipedia look for those articles which interest them, fix them when they are 
wrong, and add to them when they are lacking. Almost anyone can be an editor – making 
Wikipedia one of the least-exclusive collaborative efforts in the world. Since Wikipedia 
was “seeded” from existing articles, framing could possibly have been a factor in its early 
days, but it is not as likely in this case for a couple of reasons. First, the seed data 
provided by Nupedia was much more broad-based, and therefore less limited in scope. 
Second, and probably most important, is that the seed data came from an online resource. 
At the time of Wikipedia’s inception, online encyclopedias were still in their infancy, so 
they were significantly less “respectable” than traditional publications. That fact would 
tend to eliminate the effects of Cialdini’s “Authority”128 on resistance to editing. The 
data was not seen as being nearly as exclusive as that found in traditional encyclopedia 
formats, so when the Wikipedia gates opened, it was “game on” for the internet public. 
The final pillar of its overwhelming success is actually related to the nature of Wikipedia 
itself: it is open source. Anyone can edit, so they do. 
As mentioned before, there is one bright spot in the discussion of USG cultural 
intelligence resources: the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s (MCIA) Cultural 
Information Program (CIP), which receives guidance from the Marine Corps’ Center For 
Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). The CAOCL divides the world into 
“micro-regions,” in which they expect their career Marines to become expert.129 These 
micro-regions are illustrated in Figure 7. The micro regions appear to be based on 
national or geographic boundaries, rather than on cultural divides. Discussion is based on 
country and national boundaries (CIP information products refer to specific items such as 
the “Afghanistan Culture Guide”) rather than being based on (more loosely) cultures 
themselves, which in many instances can span national boundaries.  
 
 
128 Cialdini, Influence, 208-36. 
129 U.S. Marine Corps, “Center For Advanced Operational Culture Learning Center of Excellence 
Charter (CAOCL COE),” available online at http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/, 2. 




The map in Figure 7 illustrates the MCIA’s effort to break the world into 
manageable areas. While useful from a military-organizational point of view, such 
divisions do not support thorough cultural analysis and instead create cultural stove-
piping based on geography. For example, groups that span political boundaries (such as 
the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Romany (Gypsies) in Europe, and so on), may be split 
into different regions and thus become marginalized when that region is analyzed. It also 
reinforces the idea that cultures can be readily ascribed to set regions and ultimately 
creates seams in knowledge that can allow pertinent and vital information on these 
groups to be ignored.  
Additionally, according to the email received by the authors, the CIP is based in 
Intellipedia, which is “open to any government employee or contractor” – with a 
clearance, of course. This tends to restrict access to federal employees and denies the 
potential contributions in analysis of those outside of the government. Further, there 
appears to be no validation of new members’ credentials, as a portion of the apparently                                                  
130 Jeffrey Bearor, e-mail message to author, May 5, 2007. 
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randomly-forwarded email contained an invitation to take part in the editing process. The 
implication is that the only vetting necessary is one’s ability to log into Intellipedia, much 
like Wikipedia. Furthermore, the explanatory email details how the CIP database is being 
populated by existing documents from the classified arena.131 This has the effect of 
framing the boundaries of the discussion – of providing the answer, so to speak. Finally, 
to provide some insight as to the relative importance of the CIP: one of the authors 
personally visited the CIP, and found that it currently resides in a trailer at Quantico, with 
about 20 workstations staffed by a small number of Marines and civilians. These are 
hardly the hallmarks of either a well-supported or an “up and coming” organization. It is 
true that Wikipedia also started on a limited budget. However, Wikipedia’s strength and 
success lies in its accessibility – something which is lacking in all current intelligence 
wikis. 
It is important to note that, with the exception of the MCIA CIP, these are all 
generic intelligence resources, not cultural intelligence resources. In order to provide 
valid cultural intelligence analysis, the resource must specifically address cultural 
intelligence, otherwise the cultural focus may either be lost or never even achieved. 
Ultimately, while resources are available within the federal government to create 
a rudimentary cultural intelligence community, adherence to existing prejudices within 
the intelligence community may doom it to failure. The lack of the free sharing of 
information due to security concerns, the belief that OSINT is less valuable than 
classified information, the lack of accessibility to a wide variety of experts outside of the 
government, and the idea that group-based analysis cannot be verified – and is thus 
suspect – all contribute to an environment that is hostile to the concept of using wikis for 
intelligence analysis. In order to create a successful cultural intelligence wiki, these 
concerns must be addressed. 
 
131 Alfred B. Connable, Major U.S. Army, e-mail message to author, February 2, 2007. 
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V. THE GOLDILOCKS DILEMMA – IS THERE A PERFECT 
SOLUTION? 
A. ORGANIZATION 
It is important to initiate a cultural intelligence community on a firm foundation, 
and to anticipate long term success by building flexibility into the design. 
Thus, the initial group must consist of a diverse cross-section of the intelligence, 
academic and expatriate communities. Their selection should be accomplished by a small 
proponency office that determines initial criteria for membership. Membership should be 
by invitation only – not entirely open as is the case with Wikipedia. Once their 
credentials are validated by the proponency office, charter members could then modify 
existing seed articles, contribute their own original works, and issue invitations to other 
potential new members. 
An important first step is validation of contributors’ credentials: simply being 
asked to join is one aspect of the validation process, but potential contributors must 
provide verification of their qualifications in order to become members. Once validation 
is complete, they should be anonymously introduced to the community at large. Their 
contributions will speak for themselves: other members will pick up the concepts and run, 
or they will rest idle. But even if they rest idle, the information will still exist in a format 
that allows researchers to find it again later when it may be of more immediate need. 
An invitation to join the community is considered at least partial validation (by 
the recruiting member), and the recruiting process must include complete validation of 
credentials. However, once recruiting is complete there is no need to continually validate 
credentials. This community should be structured in such a way so that there is no further 
need to maintain titles or other personal information cues. At that point, all intra-
community communication should be conducted according to anonymous accounts. This 
will help negate the effects of Cialdinian “Authority,”132 and encourage more thorough 
peer review. 
 
132 Caldini, Influence, 214. 
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As in any community, some members may have a tendency to flock, or even to 
try to sway the system to their conclusions through means other than open discourse and 
debate. This may manifest itself in the manner in which they recruit new members. There 
must be a method for dealing with members who might attempt to “massage” the system 
in this way (or others). The primary line of defense is simply to achieve consensus from 
the community prior to actually inviting in a new member – though in the interest of time 
and simplicity, it might be desirable to use the maxim “silence equals consent,” 
especially in light of the fact that the proponency office should have already validated a 
prospective member’s credentials. However, if it seems that a member has been 
successful in stacking the deck, then there must also be means by which the community 
can offer censure – even to the point of expulsion of the offending party. 
As stated by Wales and Sanger, extensive peer review at Nupedia was 
counterproductive, but the more relaxed version of peer review is working quite well for 
Wikipedia. The authors recommend following the Wikipedia model. The goal is fluid and 
active interchange between members, and an old-fashioned system with high managerial 
oversight, such as at Caterpillar, tends to limit activity. Using the old military adage that 
“the 80% solution on time is better than the 100% solution too late,” one recognizes that 
there can be too much of a good thing (review, in this case). Further, based on the relative 
excellence of the members, extensive peer review should be unnecessary. 
Some proponents recommend establishing a physical “Office of Cultural 
Intelligence” in order to achieve a greater degree of legitimacy. Dr. Christopher Lamb 
argues in favor of an organization exclusively devoted to cultural intelligence.133  In his 
view, if cultural intelligence is truly important, it should have the infrastructure 
(bureaucracy, personnel, and resources) dedicated to it. Dr. D. Calvin Andrus, on the 
other hand, believes the intelligence community’s needs would be better served by 
networking the various analysts and experts within the intelligence community. This 
network, by utilizing four factors (a larger purpose; vast amounts of content; a sense of 
belonging to the community; name recognition of the network), would enable the 
intelligence community to conduct more meaningful and accurate intelligence analysis in 
 
133 Christopher Lamb (National Defense University), in discussion with the author, February 9, 2007. 
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support of the U.S. Government.134 However, the creation of a fully-staffed physical 
organization would be another layer in the already burdensome intelligence bureaucracy, 
especially when factoring in such requirements as a budget, new personnel, congressional 
oversight, and need to communicate with other agencies. And as illustrated in the case of 
Office of Strategic Information (OSI), ownership by a single agency could be tantamount 
to a death knell. Sooner or later, any one agency in the intelligence community may find 
itself on the chopping block. If cultural intelligence is tied to that agency, it, too, is out 
the door. As seen in WWII with the OSI, new commands can be stood up and plowed 
under in almost no time at all. The benefit of a virtual community is that the loss of one 
supporting office out of many would not be likely to lead to the downfall of the entire 
community.  
On the other hand, establishing a cultural intelligence “Czar”135 might be an 
appropriate solution. Such an oversight and proponency office could serve to: coordinate 
initial efforts; establish the interagency links required to make a virtual cultural 
intelligence network self-sustaining; standardize both the process and format by which 
member agencies contribute. The real benefit from using the “czar” concept comes in the 
form of minimal staff, minimal bureaucracy, and little funding. Remember, the goal is 
not to invent an entirely new organization to conduct cultural intelligence, but rather to 
maximize the ability of existing agencies to do so. The Office of the Cultural Intelligence 
Czar could be the conduit through which already-existing agencies coordinate their 
efforts. In the interest of longevity, utility and growth, one should apply Occam’s Razor 
to the Gordian Knot that is the current intelligence establishment – that is to say, trim the 
excess until the simplest solution presents itself. 
Selecting the appropriate sponsoring institution is paramount to ensuring the long-
term success of the community. The domain on which a web site resides can have an 
amazing effect on who will access it. A “.org,” “.edu,” or “.com” domain is much 
preferable to a “.mil” domain, for the simple reason that many potential contributors 
 
134 D. Calvin Andrus (Central Intelligence Agency), in discussion with the author, Februry 7, 2007. 
135 In this case, “czar” is used in a metaphorical sense to represent someone in a high position of 
authority who is in charge of an agency or action deemed critical to the security and safety of the citizens of 
the United States. Answers.com, “Czar,” http://www.answers.com/topic/czar (accessed May 8, 2007). 
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might not be able to access a “.mil” domain. Even those who are able to might wish to 
avoid the exposure, as evidenced by the American Anthropologists Association’s 
“Statement of Professional Responsibility.”136  
One potential location solution is the Library of Congress. While the Library of 
Congress (LOC) web site resides on a “.gov” domain, the “.gov” domain is still more 
palatable to many than a “.mil” domain. Further, the LOC is one of the world’s pre-
eminent repositories of knowledge and is almost universally revered as such. Using the 
LOC or some other such institution as the “base of operations” for a cultural intelligence 
community should help establish immediate credibility. There is some precedent for this: 
the LOC is the author of many of the military’s country studies. 
Finally, a strong cultural intelligence wiki must be able to track editors and their 
contributions. Is a large amount of input coming from one agency, several closely-related 
individuals, or contributors from a specific field? If so, is the community capable of 
absorbing the targeted input without becoming unbalanced? While it’s best for users to 
remain anonymous to each other, the system should be structured in a way that allows the 
association of any edit with a specific contributor for auditing purposes. In addition, 
tracking editors allows system analysis and maintenance such as: establishing the ratio of 
contributors to users; preventing drive-by editing; vandalism. 
Many members will be concerned with ownership of their original content, and 
this needs to be addressed in detail to insure sustainment of intellectual property rights 
and prevention of data theft. Use of off-the-shelf technologies like GFDL (used by 
Wikipedia to verify ownership) may suffice to eliminate concerns in this arena. 
Along with copyright comes the desire for remuneration. In this proposal, 
contributors would not be restricted from deriving financial gain from their contributions 
to the wiki. In fact, they would be encouraged to seek publication in additional venues, as 
that would serve the dual purposes of providing both compensation and wider exposure 
for their input. 
 
 
136 McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency,” 72. 
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B. TECHNOLOGY 
The wiki format allows the members to immediately and continuously update 
topics of interest. Adding a blog allows members to track, in near real time, areas of 
concern. Because both wikis and blogs can be “linked to,” that is, other websites can set 
up links on their pages to the analysis found on the cultural intelligence wiki, popular 
analysts can trace the linkage of their work (blogs, articles, etc.) by other members of the 
cultural intelligence community. This will expose the broader community to key concepts 
as they are brought into existence. A blog would also allow the tracking of concept 
development over time, lending a depth of background and analysis that might be missed 
in a wiki alone. Regardless of readership numbers for blogs in general, the blogging 
phenomenon offers some implications for a virtual community. Blogs can serve to spread 
new concepts widely and quickly. As stated by Kinniburgh and Denning: 
Links are added by people, not some abstract network entity implementing 
a formula for network growth. The decision to add a link is based on 
social considerations, such as trust, reputation or social pressure, as well as 
on personal preference.137 
What this means for bloggers in a virtual community is that ideas with appeal to the 
broader community can get linked to by more members, thereby causing the ideas to 
quickly gain relevance and widespread distribution. When community members gain the 
trust and respect of their peers (the goal being that the trust and respect is based on 
quality of product, rather than Cialdinian “Authority”) their works will be more 
frequently searched for, read, and linked to. So, while an article in the associated wiki 
might take quite some time to develop, the emerging concepts that help drive the final 
success of the article can already be receiving exposure in the blogosphere. That can have 
the added benefit of not only exposing the greater virtual community to leading-edge 
concepts that have yet to be officially published, but also serve to prepare them to 
become contributors to the new articles themselves, either pre- or post-publication. 
There are a number of other benefits to establishing the community in wiki 
format. The costs to establish wikis and blogs are relatively minor. As discussed in 
 
137 James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning, “Blogs and Military Information Strategy,” JSOU Report 
06-5, June 2006, 7. The JSOU Press, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2006. 
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Chapters III and IV, startup costs (monetary, hardware, personnel) for wikis and blogs 
can be quite minimal, especially when compared to fully-staffed, physical organizations 
and bureaucracy. Although it has not achieved the same level of broad success as 
Wikipedia, Intellipedia’s wiki still only cost a few thousand dollars and took only days to 
implement. In addition, it offers responsiveness, low maintenance costs, and minimal 
additional bureaucracy.138 Compared to the costs incurred by more traditional 
intelligence resources – both in terms of systems and organizations – a wiki is a 
unqualified bargain. 
In addition to the basic financial and hardware considerations, the connectivity 
between intelligence organizations is also critical. Generally speaking, connectivity 
problems can be avoided from the start by simply choosing a network solution. 
Wikipedia uses this sort of design, placing information on multiple servers around the 
world. The user interface is web-based, so anyone, anywhere, with web access, is able to 
use (read and write) the Wikipedia information repository. The servers are synchronized 
to prevent data loss in the event of local emergencies. In this model, the data is 
standardized, the entry method is standardized, and the viewing method is standardized. 
An added benefit to such a system is that it can be mirrored. While the authors 
recommend against hosting on a “.mil” domain, it is entirely acceptable to mirror the 
results into an arena such as the Defense Knowledge Online network (DKO). DKO is 
now the military-wide standard for knowledge management, and can be used to distribute 
information to those who may not have ready access to other cultural resources. DKO can 
accept information from a mirror origination point, and can then make it freely available 
to anyone with DKO access. 
C. CLOSED OR OPEN SOCIETY? 
There are actually two aspects to the concept of “closed” in the context of this 
discussion: that of the data and that of the environment. The data must be open source, 
but the community must be somewhat closed. 
As for the data, an open-source focus is key to the success of an effort such as 
this. As illustrated by the case of German journalist Berthold Jacob in the 1930s, a large 
 
138 Thompson, “Open-Source Spying.”  
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amount of valuable information exists outside of classified venues. The incident is 
described in A Psychological Warfare Casebook as follows: 
On March 20, 1935, this man, an author named Berthold Jacob, was 
kidnaped [sic] by agents of the German secret service from Switzerland. 
Jacob had written extensively about the German army that was then in its 
initial stages of rearmament. He had published a little book which spelled 
out virtually every detail of the revived General Staff, the army group 
commands, the various military districts, even the rifle platoons attached 
to the most recently formed Panzer divisions. It listed the names of the 168 
commanding generals of the army and supplied their biographical 
sketches.139 
But to what classified resource did Jacob refer in order to put together his “little 
book?” What spy within the German command was feeding him information? 
Amazingly, there was no spy, and Jacob’s resource wasn’t classified at all – it was the 
German newspapers of the day. During Jacob’s interrogation, Colonel Walther Nicolai 
(Hitler’s intelligence advisor) asked Jacob “Where did you get the data for your 
confounded book?”140 Jacob’s answer was as unsettling to the German as it was 
straightforward: 
Everything in my book came from reports published in the German press, 
Herr Oberst. When I stated that Major General Haase was commanding 
officer of the 17th Division and located in Nuremberg, I received my 
information from an obituary notice in a Nuremberg newspaper. The item 
in the paper stated that General Haase, who had just come to Nuremberg 
in command of the recently transferred 17th Division, had attended a 
funeral. 
In an Ulm newspaper, I found an item on the society page about a happier 
event, the wedding of a Colonel Vierow’s daughter to a Major 
Stemmermann. Vierow was described in the item as the commanding 
officer of the 36th Regiment of the 25th Division. Major Stemmermann 
was identified as the Division’s signal officer. Also present at the wedding 
was Major General Schaller, described in the story as commander of the 
division who had come the paper said, from Stuttgart where his division 
had its headquarters.141 
 
139 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 514. 
140 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 515. 
141 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 515. 
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Not only does this example validate the concept of open source data mining, but it also 
serves to reinforce a rarely-acknowledged truth, which is that classification level 
frequently has no bearing on the value of the data. Rather, the value comes from the 
analysis of the data. The Germans had assigned neither value nor classification to the 
“social” data, but it was far from worthless. Classification is more typically based on the 
need to hide the means by which the information is gathered, not the information itself. 
Open source means that anyone can look at it, use it, and analyze it. Even more, open 
source means that almost any information is available. There is no question of the right 
person not getting access to the right information because he didn’t have the appropriate 
clearance or compartmental read-on. Instead, community members are free to roam at 
will throughout the breadth and depth of the data in order to find what it is they think is 
important, put it together, and push it out for other community members to then continue 
to act on.  
The environment, on the other hand, must be somewhat sheltered from the mass 
of wider society. In the military, the goals for analysis and academic rigor are of critical 
importance. Analysis would likely suffer if the wiki was set up to simply welcome 
anyone, as Wikipedia does. This wiki would be an asset that supports USG activities, and 
by extension, the military. That means data errors would not just result in “page six 
retractions.” Rather, data errors could result in battlefield deaths. That point alone is 
enough to require a much higher standard of input than one finds in Wikipedia in general. 
Having said that, it might be appropriate to open the wiki for viewing by the general 
population, and then offering them a means to provide feedback in the event they have an 
insight that hasn’t been previously covered. 
D. SYSTEM DESIGN 
In any intelligence system such as this, there are some basic requirements: 
contributors, users, data, and data analysis. Each of these requirements can be filled in 
abundance. Further, the system itself must meet some criteria. It must be usable, 
sustainable, relevant, and verifiable. A community such as is outlined here meets these 
criteria. The wiki format has been proven to be usable in a number of civilian and 
business fields. Likewise, many of those same examples provide proof of sustainability. 
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Relevance is self-evident: cultural intelligence has not always been as tightly integrated 
into military operations as more traditional forms of intelligence, but it has been a factor 
in their success – recognized or not. The United States’ current adversaries provide ample 
reason to rely on cultural intelligence, as evidenced by intelligence demands from 
servicemembers in the field today, such as Commander Coles and Captain Olmstead. 
Regarding verifiability, the data and analysis offered by this system will be corrected by 
those taking part in it, because they will have a vested interest in making the intelligence 
product as true – and therefore as useful – as possible. 
E. POPULATING THE COMMUNITY 
 In order to set up a successful virtual cultural intelligence community, it becomes 
imperative that the community is made up of individuals who (1) believe in the concept 
of wikis as a means to produce collaborative intelligence (Chapter III) and (2) that the 
community is diverse enough to create a heterogeneous group rather than a homogenous 
amalgamation of talent (Chapter II). 
 Based on Dr. Dunbar’s findings that the optimal size of any group is 150 people 
(Chapter III), one can assume that the initial set of invitees to the cultural intelligence 
wiki should be 150 or less. This allows for the creation of a reasonably diverse group 
without the risk of overwhelming the wiki administrators – a possibility that could occur 
with a larger initial group. 
 The core group – the pioneers – should have some proselytizing element. That is, 
they should want to both “sell” the concept and invite additional talent in. It is this dual 
nature – what Gloor labels “emotional intelligence,”142 and describes as a function of a 
combination of Gladwell’s “maven” and “salesman”143 – that is most applicable. 
According to Gloor “Real salespeople feel what their clients want and are able to package 
and present their products in a way that profoundly appeals to those clients.”144 
 These pioneers will build the community needed to conduct cultural intelligence. 
By utilizing existing social and peer networks, they can tap into existing talent and 
 
142 Gloor, Swarm Creativity, 44. 
143 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 61 and 70.  
144 Gloor, Swarm Creativity, 44. 
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further expand the community. Continued series of invitations will result in exponential 
growth, and the community will populate in short order. Since the community is 
predicated on the fact that existing members vet new members, the percentage of 
“lurkers,” that is, people who are members but don’t actively participate, should be lower 
than the Wikipedia example. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, cultural intelligence, while of vital importance to the SOF community, 
is not a priority for the established intelligence agencies. Culture, with its myriad of 
definitions, highlights the difficulty of utilizing national-technical means to conduct 
cultural intelligence. Additionally, with the current focus on “actionable analysis,” the 
government bureaucracy lacks the drive or the desire to create another intelligence 
apparatus to conduct cultural analysis. However, by utilizing new media to create a 
virtual community where various experts with an interest in culture can coordinate and 
analyze cultural information, it is possible to create a new cultural intelligence capability 
– one that is not limited by a physical structure, and that can grow rapidly and almost 
automatically. 
Technology exists which could allow the U.S. to take advantage of existing 
intelligence agencies to overcome its shortfall in cultural intelligence, both with low 
overhead and high coverage. The U.S. military, specifically the SOF community, has 
identified the importance of cultural intelligence in achieving success in its missions. 
Much of modern warfighting occurs on the information front, yet the U.S. military only 
pays lip service to problem of developing operations based on thorough cultural 
intelligence assessments. Success in this full-spectrum fight will hinge on DoD’s 
incorporation of the full range of warfighting tools, not just the lethal ones. 
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